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I. INTRODUCTION
Genetic privacy and police practices have come to the fore in the
criminal justice system. Developing case law1 and stories in the
media2 document that police are surreptitiously harvesting the
Some sources indicate that
DNA of putative suspects.3
surreptitious data banking may also be in its infancy.4 In one
twist, a sample of DNA from a five-year-old Pap smear of an
unsuspecting and unsuspected relative of the infamous BTK killer
in Kansas City contributed to his arrest.5
Surreptitious DNA harvesting6 by the police is currently
unregulated by the Fourth Amendment. The few courts that have
addressed the issue consistently find that the police are free to
harvest DNA abandoned by a putative suspect in a public place.7
Little in the nascent surreptitious–harvesting case law suggests
1 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341, 351–52 (Mass. 2007) (discussing
methods employed by Boston police to obtain suspect’s DNA); State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27,
31 (Wash. 2007) (explaining ruse invented by Seattle Police Department to collect
defendant’s DNA); State v. Christian, No. 04-0900, 2006 WL 2419031, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Aug. 23, 2006) (describing subterfuge employed by Iowa City police to collect suspect’s
DNA).
2 See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Lawyers Fight DNA Samples Gained on Sly, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
3, 2008, at A1 (describing differing opinions on the legality of surreptitiously collected DNA
samples).
3 A “putative suspect” is one whom the police suspect of having committed a crime but
for whom the police do not have sufficient evidence to meet the probable-cause standard for
a search warrant to get a sample of the suspect’s blood or saliva for DNA analysis.
4 See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Grand, The Blooding of America: Privacy and the DNA Dragnet, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 2277, 2280 (2002) (noting that law enforcement agencies may be creating
massive database of DNA profiles); Richard Willing, Local DNA Labs Avoid State and U.S.
Limits: Databases Nab Criminals, but Legality in Question, USA TODAY, Mar. 26, 2007, at
1A (“A growing number of police crime labs are adding DNA from suspects to
databases . . . .”); Tom Precious, Crime Lab Lambasted over DNA Database; Policies
Defended as Needed Both To Solve and Prevent Crimes, BUFFALO NEWS, May 21, 2006, at
A1 (explaining county’s policy concerning expansion of state’s collection of genetic
information).
5 Ellen Nakashima, From DNA of Family, a Tool to Make Arrests: Privacy Advocates Say
the Emerging Practice Turns Relatives into Genetic Informants, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2008,
at A01.
6 The term “surreptitious harvesting” is used in this Article instead of the term
“surreptitious sampling.” It is a term that more comprehensively captures the police
conduct at issue.
7 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 1.
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that surreptitious data banking would be regulated under current
judicial conceptions of the Fourth Amendment.
Interestingly, some evidence exists that surreptitious DNA
harvesting is also happening in the noncriminal context.
Apparently, some amateur genealogists have made surreptitious
efforts to get DNA from a putative relative for ancestry or kinship
testing.8 In one circumstance, a high-profile celebrity divorce, a
private investigator was able to obtain dental floss for DNA
paternity analysis from the garbage of the putative father.9
Even in its infant stages, DNA harvesting by private parties is
regulated. In the cases of the amateur genealogist and the private
investigator, it is very possible that such conduct falls within the
prohibitions of a genetic-privacy statute in some jurisdictions.10 If
so, the genetic-privacy intruder may be liable for damages in a
private cause of action.11
If a private party targeted a putative suspect as a potential
research subject rather than a subject of a police investigation, the
law applicable to human-subject research would raise a host of
barriers.12 The legal and ethical prohibition against obtaining
research samples of any kind from a putative subject without that
subject’s informed consent is one of the foundational principles of
modern human-subject research.13
So why does the law regard genetic privacy issues in criminal
and civil contexts differently?
Why do surreptitious-DNAharvesting practices by private parties get appreciably more legal
scrutiny than such practices by police? One broad-brush answer
8 Amy Harmon, Stalking Strangers’ DNA To Fill in the Family Tree, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,
2007, at A1.
9 David M. Halbfinger & Allison Hope Weiner, Celebrity Lawyer in Talks About
Wiretapping Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2006, at B7.
10 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-21-1 to -6 (West 2012) (generally prohibiting use of
genetic information without informal and written consent). See generally Elizabeth E. Joh,
DNA Theft: Recognizing the Crime of Nonconsensual Genetic Collection and Testing, 91
B.U.L. REV. 665 (2011) (arguing for the criminalization of private-party theft of another’s
DNA).
11 § 24-21-6(B).
12 See generally CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH
WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS (2005) (explaining human-subject research law).
13 Id.
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is that society places more value on the public-safety goal of
solving crimes than on the needs of amateur genealogists, divorce
lawyers, and genetic researchers. That broad-brush answer is
unsatisfactory.
Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on surreptitious
harvesting creates an all-or-nothing dynamic. If a putative
suspect—one for whom the police have some reasonable suspicion
but not enough for a search warrant—abandons his DNA in a
public place, the police can do with the sample what they will,
without limitation. The police can do the same for a suspect for
whom they have only a hunch. They can also do the same for
someone for whom they have no suspicion, including a victim or a
witness. They can do so without a suspect’s, a witness’s, or a
victim’s consent or knowledge. If surreptitious DNA harvesting is
not a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, the police can do
whatever they want with anyone’s DNA.
The thrust of this Article is that this all-or-nothing dynamic of
DNA-harvesting jurisprudence is an understandable but
misguided judicial response to the immediate benefits of a new
technology. This Article proposes that police may seize abandoned
property containing human cells, which include DNA, without a
warrant or probable cause; but, the police need a search warrant
supported by probable cause to mine those cells for any genetic
information.
Part I reviews the current state of forensic DNA technology as
it relates to surreptitious harvesting. Part II reviews existing
surreptitious-harvesting case law and the debate about
surreptitious harvesting of out-of-body DNA among commentators.
Part III frames the surreptitious-harvesting circumstance within
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and identifies three fallacies
that accompany current perspectives. Part IV posits a model of an
expectation of genetic privacy—a kaleidoscope of identity—that
accounts for its physical, informational, and dignitary dimensions.
Part V evaluates whether such an expectation of genetic privacy is
one that society recognizes as reasonable. It examines the use of
DNA metaphors in popular news accounts through the prism of
linguistic theory to conclude that society recognizes DNA as a
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source of core identity.
Part VI concludes that a careful,
interdisciplinary analysis of surreptitious DNA harvesting within
the context of existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence militates
against an all-or-nothing dynamic and in favor of a requirement
that police get a search warrant supported by probable cause to
mine an abandoned item for DNA.
II. THE TECHNOLOGY
Twenty-five years ago, the police did not have the investigative
techniques at their disposal to engage in surreptitious DNA
analysis. U.S. commercial laboratories began using forensic DNA
analysis for investigative purposes in 1986.14 The FBI began using
DNA analysis in casework in 1988.15 Today, over one hundred
fifty public laboratories are available for forensic DNA testing in
the United States.16
Prior to the advent of forensic DNA technology, fingerprints and
blood typing were the primary forensic identification tools.17
However, fingerprints were found only at crime scenes where the
perpetrator handled an item, and blood typing was of limited
discriminatory value.18 Forensic DNA analysis has reduced many
of these limitations because DNA exists in any human cell with a
nucleus.19 Biological samples sufficient for use in DNA analysis
can exist, for example, in bloodstains,20 semen stains,21 bones,22
teeth,23 hair,24 saliva,25 urine,26 feces,27 fingernail debris,28 muscle
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 28 (1992).
Id.
16 JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND GENETICS OF
STR MARKERS 3 (2d ed. 2005).
17 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 27–29.
18 BUTLER, supra note 16, at 5.
19 Id. at 33.
20 Bruce Budowle et al., Simple Protocols for Typing Forensic Biological Evidence:
Chemiluminescent Detection for Human DNA Quantitation and Restriction Fragment
Length Polymorphism (RFLP) Analyses and Manual Typing of Polymerase Chain Reaction
(PCR) Amplified Polymorphisms, 16 ELETROPHORESIS 1559, 1560 (1995).
21 Id.
22 Peter Gill et al., Identification of the Remains of the Romanov Family by DNA Analysis,
6 NATURE GENETICS 130, 130 (1994).
23 A. Alvarez Garcia et al., Effect of Environmental Factors on PCR–DNA Analysis from
14
15
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tissue,29 cigarette butts,30 postage stamps,31 dandruff,32 and,
ironically, fingerprints.33
Because a human cell and its nucleus can survive departure
from the body itself, transfers of DNA from one place to another
can occur frequently, be it from suspect to victim, victim to
suspect, suspect or victim to an object or location.34 Given
advances in technology, the robustness of the sample is becoming
less and less important. A forensic scientist can now extract DNA
from a sample that is not visible to the human eye.35
The availability of out-of-body DNA for forensic analysis has
greatly expanded the investigative options of the police.
For
example, crime-scene, out-of-body DNA has led to convictions in
previously unsolved crimes.36 In some instances, it has led to the

Dental Pulp, 109 INT’L J. LEGAL MED. 125, 125 (1996).
24 Russell Higuchi et al., DNA Typing from Single Hairs, 332 NATURE 543, 543 (1988);
M.R. Wilson et al., Extraction, PCR Amplification and Sequencing of Mitochondrial DNA
from Human Hair Shafts, 18 BIOTECHNIQUES, 662, 662 (1995).
25 David Sweet & Gary G. Shutler, Analysis of Salivary DNA Evidence from a Bite Mark
on a Body Submerged in Water, 44 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1069, 1069 (1999).
26 Toshihiro Yasuda et al., A Simple Method of DNA Extraction and STR Typing from
Urine Samples Using a Commercially Available DNA/RNA Extraction Kit, 48 J. FORENSIC
SCI. 108, 108 (2003).
27 Andrew J. Hopwood et al., DNA Typing from Human Faeces, 108 INT’L J. LEGAL MED.
237, 237 (1996).
28 P. Wiegand et al., DNA Typing of Debris from Fingernails, 106 INT’L J. LEGAL MED. 81,
81 (1993).
29 Manfred N. Hochmeister, PCR Analysis of DNA from Fresh and Decomposed Bodies
and Skeletal Remains in Medicolegal Death Investigations, 98 METHODS OF MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY 19, 19 (1998).
30 Manfred N. Hochmeister et al., PCR-Based Typing of DNA Extracted from Cigarette
Butts, 104 INT’L J. LEGAL MED. 229, 229 (1991).
31 B. Hopkins et al., The Use of Minisatellite Variant Repeat–Polymerase Chain Reaction
(MVR–PCR) to Determine the Source of Saliva on a Used Postage Stamp, 39 J. FORENSIC
SCI. 526, 526 (1994).
32 Birgit Herber & Kurt Herold, DNA Typing of Human Dandruff, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI.
648, 648 (1998).
33 Roland A.H. van Oorschot & Maxwell K. Jones, DNA Fingerprints from Fingerprints,
387 NATURE 767, 767 (1997).
34 H.C. Lee et al., Guidelines for the Collection and Preservation of DNA Evidence, 41 J.
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 344 (1991).
35 BUTLER, supra note 16, at 35.
36 See, e.g., State v. Whittey, 821 A.2d 1086, 1089 (N.H. 2003) (affirming conviction for
murder supported by DNA analysis of crime-scene semen frozen for eighteen years).

452

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:445

exoneration of wrongfully convicted inmates, some of whom had
served five, ten, or twenty years in jail.37
It has also led to the collection of DNA from one whom the
police think may have committed a crime but for whom they do not
have probable cause for a search warrant to get a DNA sample.
Whether one calls this technique the collection of abandoned or
shed DNA,38 DNA harvesting, or covert involuntary sampling,39
the police are beginning to use the technique more frequently.40
Sometimes, the police follow a person of interest and collect a
discarded item that may contain sufficient cells for DNA
analysis.41 Sometimes, the police lure a person of interest to the
police station for a noncustodial interview and offer that person a
cigarette or a soda.42 Sometimes, the police have been even more
creative, as in State v. Athan.43 There, the police had renewed
their investigation of Athan, a possible suspect in a twenty-yearold homicide. They sent a letter to Athan, who was living out of
state, posing as a fictitious law firm asking him to join an equally
fictitious class action lawsuit concerning parking tickets. Athan
signed the enclosed class action authorization form and mailed it
back. The forensic laboratory obtained a sample of Athan’s DNA
from saliva on the envelope flap. Athan was subsequently
convicted.44

See generally INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org.
D.H. Kaye, Science Fiction and Shed DNA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 62, 62
(2006).
39 Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic
Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 882 (2006).
40 See generally State v. Christian, No. 04-0900, 2006 WL 2419031 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug.
23, 2006); Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341 (Mass. 2007); State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27
(Wash. 2007).
41 See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 2 (describing how police followed suspect and obtained
DNA from discarded cigarette butt).
42 See, e.g., Chastain, 2006 WL 2419031, at *1 (collecting DNA from water bottle offered
to suspect during an apparent volunteer-position interview).
43 158 P.3d at 31–32.
44 Id.
37
38
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III. THE COMMENTATORS AND THE CASES
Commentators have evaluated the harvesting of out-of-body
DNA from putative suspects in light of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
One, Elizabeth Joh, has rejected the
appropriateness of a Fourth Amendment abandoned-property or
“trash” analogy to this circumstance and has stated that “the
Fourth Amendment’s protections appear to fall short of providing a
constitutional basis from which to challenge abandoned DNA
She also evaluated other possible analogies—
collection.”45
fingerprints, body parts, and human waste—and found these
interpretive mechanisms wanting for “what is important about
genetic information.”46 She has suggested that the deficiencies in
these various analogies “make the case for ‘genetic exceptionalism’:
that DNA is a unique category, incapable of abandonment (and
perhaps of sale or patent), and warranting its own analysis
without reference to other body parts or to trash.”47
Another commentator, David Kaye, has concluded that the
fingerprint analogy is the correct analogy; courts should not be
distracted by the occasional deception involved in harvesting outof-body DNA—to do otherwise “would be to indulge in ‘genetics
exceptionalism.’ ”48 He has focused particular attention on the
merit of the fingerprint analogy, closely debating with another
commentator whether information gathered at the genetic
locations used in STR DNA analysis can tell us something about
an individual beyond nametag information.49
Both Kaye and Joh use the abandonment theory and the Katz v.
United States50 reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test in their
analyses.
Both conclude that current Fourth Amendment
Joh, supra note 39, at 868.
Id. at 868–69.
47 Id. at 869.
48 David H. Kaye, The Science of DNA Identification: From The Laboratory to the
Courtroom (and Beyond), 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 409, 420 (2007).
49 Kaye, supra note 38, at 66; Simon A. Cole, Is the “Junk” DNA Designation Bunk?, 102
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 54, 54 (2007). See generally David H. Kaye, Please, Let’s Bury the
Junk: The CODIS Loci and the Revelation of Private Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 70 (2007) (responding to Cole).
50 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
45
46
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jurisprudence likely does not provide a putative suspect
Constitutional protection from surreptitious harvesting of out-ofbody DNA. Joh argues that the putative suspect should have such
protection because DNA is different; thus, traditional Fourth
Amendment analogies—fingerprints, for example—are not
appropriate.51 Kaye argues the putative suspect should not have
constitutional protection because a DNA nametag is not different
enough from a fingerprint for Fourth Amendment purposes.52
Courts have uniformly rejected Fourth Amendment protection
against surreptitious harvesting of out-of-body DNA by the police.
By and large, they have found (1) that the putative suspect
abandoned the item upon or in which the DNA-laden cells were
found and (2) as a result, there was no expectation of privacy in
the item or that which it was in or on. By focusing on the putative
suspect’s privacy in the discarded item, virtually no court has
explicitly considered either the person’s privacy rights in the DNA
itself or the nature and extent of those genetic-privacy rights.
One of the lengthier opinions on the Fourth Amendment
implications of surreptitious harvesting of out-of-body DNA is
People v. Sigsbee.53 In 1975, the police had some evidence, shy of
probable cause, to suspect that Donald Sigsbee had murdered a
woman found in a remote landfill area. However, forensic DNA
testing did not exist at the time. Twenty-eight years later, in
2003, the police began a loose surveillance of Sigsbee.54 One
investigator followed Sigsbee to a Wendy’s restaurant and watched
him eat his meal and drink a root beer through a straw.55 When
Sigsbee left the Wendy’s, the investigator retrieved the cup and
straw from the trash and submitted it for forensic DNA testing.56

Joh, supra note 39, at 882–83.
Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76
WASH. L. REV. 413, 436–40 (2001). Ironically, Kaye suggests, at the least, that an analysis
using abandonment theory, which says that individuals have abandoned any Fourth
Amendment protection in their DNA when they abandons it in public, is a closer call than
Joh seems to suggest.
53 No. 03-0342, slip op. (Onondaga, N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Oct. 30, 2003).
54 Id. at 8.
55 Id. at 9.
56 Id. at 9–10.
51
52
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The trial court denied Sigsbee’s motion to suppress the straw
and the DNA test results from the straw based on a Fourth
Amendment violation.57 It held that Sigsbee had abandoned any
Fourth Amendment privacy interest in his DNA on the straw
when he abandoned the straw:
[W]hen the defendant discarded the straw he also
discarded any expectation of privacy in the DNA
evidence on the straw. While it is unlikely that the
defendant believed that he was discarding bodily fluids
that would show his DNA profile, nonetheless, by
discarding the cup and straw into the trash receptacle,
he relinquished any expectation of privacy concerning
those items themselves or any bodily fluids contained
on them. . . . The scientific analysis of the straw does
not involve any further search and seizure of the
defendant’s person or property and does not, therefore,
involve any violation of the defendant’s constitutional
rights to be free from unlawful searches and seizures.58
Other courts have taken a similar approach. In Commonwealth
v. Cabral, the court found that the defendant had voluntarily
abandoned the reasonable expectation of privacy he had in his
saliva when he “expectorated” on a public street.59 With his
expectoration, “he assumed the risk of the public witnessing his
action and thereafter taking possession of his bodily fluids.”60 In

Id. at 28.
Id. at 31–32. The Sigsbee court also made an effort to analyze the possibility of Sigsbee
having an expectation of privacy in his bodily fluids:
Unlike escaping heat from one’s home, the voluntary discarding of a cup
and straw in a public restaurant involved a conscious and intentional act
which affirmatively demonstrated the relinquishment of any expectation of
privacy that one may have had in those items. The loss of heat from one’s
home, for the most part, does not constitute a conscious, intentional or
voluntary act of the owner of the home.
Id. at 32. The court then went on to reject more directly any theory that Sigsbee had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his bodily fluids.
59 Commonwealth v. Cabral, 866 N.E.2d 429, 433 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
60 Id.
57
58
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Commonwealth v. Bly, the defendant left the police station after
an interview, leaving a water bottle and cigarette butts.61 The
court never reached the abandonment issue identified by the
Sigsbee trial court. Instead, it grounded its decision on the
defendant’s “wholesale failure to manifest any expectation of
privacy in the items whatsoever.”62 Even in a case where the court
suppressed the surreptitiously seized out-of-body DNA, State v.
Reed, its analysis reflected a pure abandonment approach.63 The
court found that Reed had not abandoned the cigarette butt he had
flicked onto his own patio in the back of his apartment, an area in
which he had a reasonable expectation of privacy.64
In State v. Christian, an undercover officer sat in on an
interview that Christian had with a city agency.65 During the
interview, the officer provided Christian with two water bottles
from which he drank and the interviewer provided him with a
piece of cake accompanied by a fork.66 When Christian left, he
took the magazine he had brought with him and the interview
paperwork but not the fork or water bottles.67 The court found
that Christian had abandoned the water bottle and fork when he
did not take them with him and thus had no expectation of privacy
in them.68
Unlike the Sigsbee, Cabral and Bly courts, however, the
Christian court hinted at the possibility of a deeper, DNA-focused
privacy analysis when it said, “[i]n the absence of any definitive
authority to the contrary, we are unable to say Christian had a
subjective or objective expectation of privacy in the DNA shed on
the items seized.”69 The court went on to note that it would have

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341, 349 n.3 (Mass. 2007).
Id. at 357.
State v. Reed, 641 S.E.2d 320, 321–23 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
Id.
No. 04-0900, 2006 WL 2419031, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2006).
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
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found that Christian had abandoned any such expectation, even if
it did exist.70
In State v. Athan, the police obtained DNA from saliva on the
flap of an envelope Athan had licked before he sent it unwittingly
to the police as a part of an elaborate ruse.71 The defendant
asserted that he had a privacy interest in his body and bodily
functions, including his saliva.72 The court found that under the
circumstances Athan had “no inherent privacy interest in saliva.”73
The court noted that the saliva was not taken as part of an
invasive procedure as in pre-employment urinalysis testing
programs.74 It found that Athan had abandoned his saliva when
he licked the envelope and then mailed it, a circumstance similar
to that of “a person spitting on the sidewalk or leaving a cigarette
butt in an ashtray.”75 The envelope effectively became the
property of the police.76
Interestingly, the ACLU, as amicus curiae, also argued on
Athan’s behalf that DNA “has the potential to reveal a vast
amount of personal information, including medical conditions and
familial relations,” and thus Athan should have a privacy
interest.77 The court disagreed:
While this may be true in some circumstances, the
State’s use of Athan’s DNA here was narrowly limited
to identification purposes. What was done with the
letter, including DNA testing for the limited purpose of
identification, was not within the sender’s control. The
concerns raised by the ACLU, while valid, are not
present in this case. The State used the sample for

Id.
158 P.3d 27, 32 (Wash. 2007). See supra note 44 and accompanying text for a more
detailed description of the elaborate ruse.
72 Athan, 158 P.3d at 33.
73 Id. at 33–34.
74 Id. at 33.
75 Id. at 34.
76 Id.
77 Id.
70
71
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identification purposes only, not for purposes that
raise the concerns advanced by the ACLU.78
Overall, those courts that have analyzed the Fourth
Amendment consequences of surreptitious harvesting of out-ofbody DNA by the police have used a very narrow focus for their
analysis. Technically, the intrusion-on-property analyses were not
Olmstead-like; each court that focused on the item upon or within
which the DNA was found articulated the magic words of Katz’s
But the courts’
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test.79
abandonment analysis—an exclusively intrusion-on-property
focus—was completely dispositive. So too with the two courts—
Sigsbee and Athan—that applied an intrusion-on-place analysis
(the body in these cases) used a very narrow approach, focusing on
the lack of intrusion into the body and articulating the magic
words of Katz. Further, the only court to conduct an intrusion-oninformation analysis—Athan—also focused its analysis quite
narrowly, evaluating only the information actually sought and
obtained by the police rather than all the information potentially
available.
The narrowness of the courts’ analyses in surreptitiousharvesting cases reflects a misguided focus borne of a
misapplication of Katz. Each court that conducted an intrusionon-property analysis asked whether the defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the discarded items. Almost
without exception,80 no court asked whether the defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his out-of-body DNA or in the
DNA-laden cells. Just as the appropriate question in Katz was
whether Katz had a reasonable expectation of privacy in certain
private communications by phone, so too in the surreptitiousharvesting cases, the appropriate question is whether the
defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their out-ofId.
See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (establishing reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test for Fourth Amendment questions).
80 The Athan and Sigsbee courts briefly asked versions of the question and concluded in
the negative without any substantial analysis. Athan, 158 P.3d at 33; People v. Sigsbee,
No. 03-0342, slip op. at 31–33 (Onondaga, N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Oct. 30, 2003).
78
79
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body DNA and whatever the personal sense of privacy attached to
that DNA might be.
Neither courts nor commentators have fully developed the
Fourth Amendment analysis applicable to surreptitious harvesting
of out-of-body DNA by the police. Much of the discussion to date
has focused on the abandonment and fingerprint analogies. Those
analogies conceive of genetic privacy through the prism of a
property, a physical-location (most often, the body), or an
information paradigm. In the property paradigm, out-of-body
DNA is no longer part of its owner because it has been abandoned
and thus is up for grabs. In the physical-location paradigm, either
the DNA is no longer part of the body or the police did not
physically intrude into the body, or both. In the information
paradigm, the police are gathering no more intrusive a body of
data than they would if they had gathered fingerprints—
information that is relatively nonintrusive and one-dimensional.
Under these analytical paradigms, courts have found no Fourth
Amendment violation occurred when out-of-body DNA is harvested
surreptitiously, and commentators have conceded that those
analyses will likely continue to carry the day.81
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: BEYOND PROPERTY
A. KATZ, KYLLO, AND JONES

The nature and scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protection
against an intrusion on genetic privacy is not readily apparent
from the text. It guarantees that “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”82
The prohibition reads like one against intrusions on an
individual’s physical privacy by the government—be it real

81 Kaye, supra note 48, at 420. Joh suggests that DNA is different and argues that the
idea of genetic exceptionalism suggests that we should be more cautious in using preexisting analogies to capture the full import of a new technology. Joh, supra note 39, at
873–74.
82 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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property, bodily integrity, other physical items—and makes no
explicit mention of more intangible conceptions of privacy.
The Fourth Amendment also says nothing about security from
intrusions into out-of-body DNA left in a public place, just as it
says nothing about intrusions involving a host of other modern
technologies like a GPS,83 public surveillance cameras, or various
kinds of technological eavesdropping. Each involves a type of
technology that the Framers had not contemplated. Each intrudes
on more than purely property- or place-based privacy.
Historically, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence reflected a relatively narrow and somewhat rigid,
legalistic focus on property and place in defining the extent of
Fourth Amendment privacy.84 Without a physical invasion, or a
search of a person, papers, or tangible material effects, no Fourth
Amendment violation occurs.85 In this conception, privacy “was
tied very closely to notions of property rights.”86
In 1967, the Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States,87
abandoned the property and place paradigms as the exclusive
analytical models for determining when an intrusion on Fourth
Amendment privacy has occurred.
Katz had made several
telephone calls from inside a public telephone booth. Because the
government suspected Katz of engaging in illegal gambling
activities, it affixed a listening and recording device to the outside
of the booth to record Katz’s end of the conversations.88 As a result
of the evidence gathered from eavesdropping on his conversations,
Katz was convicted of illegal gambling activities.89 The police had
not intruded on Katz’s sense of privacy in his property or in a place
that was his, as they never entered the booth.

Global Positioning System.
See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (“The Amendment itself
shows that the search is to be of material things—the person, the house, his papers or his
effects.”).
85 Id. at 466.
86 Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to
Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1308–09 (2002).
87 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
88 Id. at 348, 354.
89 Id. at 348.
83
84
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In its decision, the Court redefined its approach to Fourth
Amendment privacy in two ways. It shifted the inquiry to a direct
focus on the privacy of the person and away from the narrow,
technical legal status of the property or place searched. It also
expansively defined how to measure the privacy at stake:
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places. What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.90
Thus, Katz could have a Fourth Amendment privacy interest into
which the government may not intrude, even if that interest exists
in a public place in which, prior to Katz, a court would have found
no privacy interest.
The “people, not places” language meant that Katz’s Fourth
Amendment privacy interest was a much more intangible one than
that residing in the space within the phone booth. It resided in
Katz’s attitude towards the phone conversation and its content.
Katz’s conduct in choosing a phone booth and in closing its door
showed that he wanted to have a private conversation, not simply
a private space. Katz sought to keep private the content of his
phone conversation by his behavior. His behavior and the
information he sought to keep secure told the Court the most
about Katz’s sense of privacy. The Court did not, however, stop
with this substantial shift.
The advantage of the more technical, property-based approach
had been the well-bounded, albeit legalistic, nature of its
conception of privacy. The legal status of the searched item or
place told all. It completely defined the nature and extent of the
privacy interest. The shift in focus to a more intangible, personal
privacy conception left open the difficult question of how to
measure the nature and scope of person-based privacy. Katz

90

Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted).
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provided an answer, though not a well-bounded one. Justice
Harlan’s concurrence described how to assess the nature and scope
of any possible Fourth Amendment privacy interest a person
might hold: “there is a twofold requirement, first that a person
[has] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”91
Justice Harlan’s “two-fold requirement” for measuring whether
the privacy interest at stake warrants Fourth Amendment
protection—the Katz test—expanded the privacy inquiry. Most
dramatically, it meant that courts would have to articulate the
expectation of privacy a person might have in the circumstances of
the case and to measure society’s attitude towards that person’s
expectation.
The Court offered little guidance about how to go about this
process other than solving the case in front of it. A single
ungrounded, generalized statement about “the vital role that the
public telephone has come to play in private communication”
captures the Court’s methodology for assessing society’s attitude
towards Katz’s expectation.92 Thus, post-Katz, the two-pronged
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test seems to exist as an
unbounded, ad hoc assessment by a court of society’s attitude
toward the privacy interest at issue.
The legacy of post-Katz courts regarding the reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test has been decidedly mixed, according to
commentators.93 For example, Orin Kerr has contended that many
courts simply continued with some form of a property-based
approach to determining the scope of Fourth Amendment
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 352.
93 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 823–24 (2004) (noting that very
little has changed since Katz); Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The
Supreme Court, Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 20–36 (2002)
(concluding that Katz is a failure if its original purpose was to regulate modern surveillance
technologies with Fourth Amendment standards); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’
Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 1325, 1343–62 (2002) (noting how post-Katz decisions have taken advantage of Katz’s
failure to provide any real guidance on determining privacy values).
91
92
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privacy.94 Whatever the nature of the legacy, in 2001, in Kyllo v.
United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the core approach of
Katz.95
The police suspected that Kyllo was growing marijuana in his
house using high-intensity lamps that produced large amounts of
heat. Rather than obtain a search warrant, they used a thermal
imaging device to measure the amount of heat emanating from
Kyllo’s house.96 The device did not “enter” Kyllo’s house to
measure the amount of heat; it measured it only after the heat left
the house.97 The Court again rejected a pure property-based
analysis. It found that the use of the thermal imaging device
constituted the kind of intrusion prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment even though the police never entered Kyllo’s home.98
The majority relied heavily on factors like information (the
potential for acquiring intimate details), location (from within the
home), and the language of the Constitution (the use of the term
“houses” in the Fourth Amendment) to measure the scope of the
personal privacy right.
To be sure, the opinion is heavily
influenced by the property perspective; it goes so far as to say that
“[i]n the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details,
because the entire area is held safe from prying government
eyes.”99
But a pure property analysis would have resulted in a different
outcome because the police never trespassed into Kyllo’s home.
For the Kyllo majority, home-based intimacy—a personal-privacy
term—deserves Fourth Amendment protection, even for heat
outside the home.100
Most recently, in United States v. Jones, the Court reaffirmed
its commitment to a beyond-just-property analysis.101 The police
had placed a GPS device on the underside of a car driven by Jones
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Kerr, supra note 93, at 823–27.
533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012).
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and monitored his public whereabouts for four weeks.102 In a set of
three opinions, all nine members of the Court recognized that,
whether one had to do a property analysis at all, it was only the
start of an analysis that included the Katz test. In fact, five
members of the Court did or would have found that Jones had a
reasonable expectation of privacy that society would recognize as
reasonable in his aggregated public whereabouts over the course of
four weeks.103
The Katz test thus provides some insight into the framework of
an analysis of the nature and scope of the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against the police practice of surreptitious harvesting of
out-of-body DNA. One must ask whether the person whose out-ofbody DNA was harvested had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in that DNA. The property status of that DNA is only one
factor.104 The location of the DNA, the information which that
DNA may contain, as well as the individual’s attitude towards that
DNA and its contents might be informative. One must then ask if
that is an expectation that society is willing to recognize as
reasonable. The core question, in its simplest terms, is whether
the individual and society expect privacy in DNA—whether we
expect our DNA to be secure from government intrusion.
If one considers the locus of analysis in surreptitious-harvesting
cases to be one’s personal sense of genetic privacy rather than only
one’s sense of DNA as property, a subtle but powerful analytical
shift occurs. The abandonment question then hinges on the
knowledge of and intention to abandon that privacy. The existence
of one’s DNA outside of one’s body and in public is not an
automatic Fourth Amendment disqualifier. And the limited use by

Id. at 948.
Justice Sotomayor found that such an expectation would exist if that issue had needed
to be reached. Id. at 956. Justices Alito, Breyer, Ginsburg and Kagan found that one did
exist. Id. at 964.
104 One commentator on surreptitious DNA harvesting by the police has concluded that,
“because it is grounded in physical boundaries, the Fourth Amendment fails to protect
genetic privacy adequately.” Joh, supra note 39, at 866. Joh does briefly question whether
abandoned DNA is really abandoned. Id. at 867. She also acknowledges that Katz formally
rejected a property analysis and recognizes the lack of clarity in Fourth Amendment
protection for abandoned DNA even under a property perspective. Id.
102
103
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the police of the information contained in that DNA does not
resolve the expectation question. In each instance, the shift from a
narrow to more expansive focus suggests the possibility of a
different result in surreptitious-harvesting cases.
B. THE ABANDONMENT FALLACY

In the property or abandonment context, the Katz question
changes from whether individuals abandoned their saliva,
cigarette butt, or water bottle, to whether they abandoned their
expectation of genetic privacy in their DNA. As one court has
phrased it:
The distinction between abandonment in the
property-law sense and abandonment in the
constitutional sense is critical to a proper analysis of
the issue. In the law of property, the question, as
defendant correctly states, is whether the owner has
voluntarily,
intentionally,
and
unconditionally
relinquished his interest in the property so that
another, having acquired possession, may successfully
assert his superior interest. In the law of search and
seizure, however, the question is whether the
defendant has, in discarding the property,
relinquished his reasonable expectation of privacy so
that its seizure and search is reasonable within the
limits of the Fourth Amendment. In essence, what is
abandoned is not necessarily the defendant’s property,
but his reasonable expectation of privacy therein.105
The significance of this shift is immediately apparent.
Abandonment requires knowledge and intention.106 Without a
showing that individuals knew that by their conduct they had
abandoned their expectation of genetic privacy in their DNA, no
105 City of St. Paul v. Vaughn, 237 N.W.2d 365, 370–71 (Minn. 1975) (footnote omitted)
(citations omitted).
106 Edward G. Mascolo, The Role of Abandonment in the Law of Search and Seizure: An
Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BUFF. L. REV. 399, 401–02 (1971).
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abandonment has occurred. The Katz Court itself explicitly
recognized this proposition when it pointed out that “[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”107
Some of the classic Fourth Amendment abandonment
circumstances involve variations on the theme of the defendant
seeing the police and either discarding drugs108 or some other
item109 or walking away from that item.110 In these kinds of cases,
courts may debate whether the defendant’s acts, words, or other
objective facts, reflect an intention to abandon or not; but, all of
them require some manifestation of intention.111 So, in Sigsbee,
Cabral, Bly et al. ample evidence existed that those putative
suspects knew and intended to abandon the straw, water bottle,
saliva, etc. at issue.112
No evidence exists suggesting any of those putative suspects
knew they were abandoning whatever expectation of genetic
privacy they had in their DNA when they went out in public. It is
speculative, at best, to conclude from a silent record that
individuals would know that they were shedding DNA;113 that they
were aware of the ability of the government to collect that DNA,
analyze it, and use it as an identification tool; or that they were
cognizant of the other kinds of uses the police could make of their
DNA, let alone the scope and breadth of genetic information about
them that might be available to those with access to it via the
appropriate technology.
Courts’ treatment of other privacy-in-public cases supports this
type of analysis. The Katz garbage cases consider the extent of the
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
State v. Britton, 633 So. 2d 1208, 1209 (La. 1994) (hiding packet of cocaine in gum
rack); State v. Crandall, 136 P.3d 30, 31 (Or. 2006) (hiding baggie underneath car).
109 United States v. Collis, 766 F.2d 219, 220 (6th Cir. 1985) (abandoning airplane luggage
after seeing DEA agents).
110 United States v. Tugwell, 125 F.3d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1997) (walking away from
suitcase at bus station after drug-sniffing dog alerts to it).
111 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1983) (“[A]n
expectation of privacy is a question of intent.”).
112 See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
113 Note that the burden of proof in such circumstances is on the prosecution to justify
their warrantless conduct. Mascolo, supra note 106, at 403–04.
107
108
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likely knowledge attributable to the “owner” of the garbage. In
California v. Greenwood,114 the Supreme Court found that “[i]t is
common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side
of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.”115 Such
“common knowledge” as to one’s shed DNA would include, at the
least, it being accessible to the police with the use of sophisticated
biotechnological tools for comparison to crime-scene samples or
inclusion in a database, or both.
Courts’ analyses of other sets of privacy-in-public cases reveal a
similar approach. The premise of fingerprint, voice-exemplar, and
handwriting-exemplar cases rests on individuals knowingly
exposing their fingerprints,116 voices,117 and handwriting118 to the
public.
And, in United States v. Jones, the Court found that
Antoine Jones had not abandoned his expectation of privacy in his
aggregated public behavior by going out in public.119
The fingerprint example is particularly important as
commentators have debated the appropriateness of analogizing
surreptitious harvesting of out-of-body DNA to surreptitious
harvesting of fingerprints.120
Superficially, the analogy is
attractive as, in each instance, the police are harvesting from
publicly available samples what will turn into identity
information.
The analogy fails, however. It is “common knowledge” that
whenever you touch something in public, you run the risk of
leaving fingerprints that can be used for identification purposes.
486 U.S. 35 (1988).
Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted).
116 See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (“Fingerprinting involves none of the
probing into an individual’s private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or
search.”).
117 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (“The physical characteristics of a
person’s voice, its tone and manner . . . are constantly exposed to the public.”).
118 See United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973) (“Handwriting . . . is repeatedly
shown to the public . . . .”).
119 132 S. Ct. 945, 950–51 (2012).
120 Compare Joh, supra note 39, at 871 (rejecting the appropriateness of the fingerprint
analogy), with Kaye, supra note 48, at 420 (supporting the appropriateness of the
fingerprint analogy).
114
115
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The same cannot be said about shed, out-of-body DNA—even if its
use is only for comparison to crime-scene samples by way of the
application of sophisticated biotechnological tools to the DNA or
inclusion in a database, or both.121
In Kyllo, the focus was on the intrusion by the police into the
intimacy of what occurred within the home.122 The heat that the
police measured outside of the home was their window into that
intimacy and thus was an impermissible Fourth Amendment
intrusion.123
Had the majority focused on the abandoned heat itself, they
would have found no violation as the police “acquired” the heat
outside the protected area of the home. Absent any evidence that
Kyllo knew that heat was escaping from his house and that it
could reveal intimate details of home activity by virtue of
technology not generally available to the public, the majority
ignored any possible abandonment analysis. In a surreptitiousharvesting case, if “measurement” of the shed, out-of-body DNA
provides the police with a similar window into some measure of
genetic intimacy or privacy and no evidence exists of the shedder’s
knowledge of that, a Fourth Amendment violation may well have
occurred even though the DNA was left in public.
C. THE OUT-OF-BODY FALLACY

Some of the surreptitious-harvesting courts—Sigsbee and
Athan—also transacted the Katz analysis with a focus on the
intrusion on one’s body in addition to the intrusion-on-property
focus. The Athan court rejected the claim that Athan had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his bodily fluids on the mailed
envelope because those fluids were not taken as a part of an
intrusive procedure.124
121 This analysis does not rely on the genetic-exceptionalism argument Joh relies on. It
also sidesteps the debate between Kaye and Cole on how much genetic information is
actually available as a result of standard forensic DNA testing. See supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
122 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001).
123 Id.
124 State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 33 (Wash. 2007).
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The essence of this approach is that any expectation of privacy
departs when the DNA leaves the body because it is no longer part
of the body. At one level, it is a variant of the abandonment
analysis. However, the focus in this analysis is directly on the
location of the DNA rather than on its status as property. Simply,
where the DNA is located tells all.
It is seductive to define an expectation of privacy in one’s body
in terms of the physical boundaries of the body.
The
quintessential Fourth Amendment bodily privacy case, Schmerber
v. California, involved the police entering Schmerber’s body to
obtain a sample of his blood for blood–alcohol analysis.125 It is
hard to divorce the sense that a privacy intrusion has occurred
from the physical act of entering the body. Often, the entry is
minimal, as when acquiring scrapings from underneath
fingernails126 or acquiring DNA by swabbing the inside of one’s
Nonetheless, courts have routinely held that an
mouth.127
intrusion on a reasonable expectation of privacy occurred.128
The advent of forensic DNA technology has begun to stretch the
boundaries of what counts as the “body.” Because a forensic
scientist can analyze cells invisible to the naked eye and obtain
analyzable DNA129 from cells that exist outside the body,130 the
police need not intrude on the body itself to obtain what heretofore
had been unobtainable without a bodily intrusion. The question in
surreptitious-harvesting cases becomes whether the out-of-body
status of the DNA automatically eliminates any Fourth
Amendment protection.
Two cases inform the beginning of an answer to this question.
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, regulations
promulgated by the Federal Railway Administration required
384 U.S. 757, 758–59 (1966).
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 292 (1973).
127 Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 656 n.5 (2d Cir. 2005); State v. O’Hagen, 914 A.2d
267, 279 (N.J. 2007). So-called buccal swabs are now the most common method for
obtaining DNA samples from a number of classes of individuals for analysis and inclusion
in state and federal genetic databases.
128 Goord, 430 F.3d at 658; O’Hagen, 914 A.2d at 280.
129 BUTLER, supra note 16, at 35.
130 See supra notes 21–35 and accompanying text.
125
126
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railroads to test certain employees for drug and alcohol through
urine testing.131 The collection of the urine sample could involve
in-person monitoring but no physical intrusion into the body
occurred.132 In spite of the lack of any bodily intrusion, the Court
found it “clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes
upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as
reasonable”133 and directly addressed the significance of the lack of
bodily intrusion:
It is not disputed, however, that chemical analysis of
urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private
medical facts about an employee, including whether he
or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. Nor can it be
disputed that the process of collecting the sample to be
tested, which may in some cases involve visual or
aural monitoring of the act of urination, itself
implicates privacy interests.134
For the Skinner Court, unlike the surreptitious-harvesting courts,
the lack of bodily intrusion did not automatically remove the
possibility of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the out-of-body
fluids and their content.135
The possibility that a person may have a reasonable expectation
of privacy that society is willing to recognize in out-of-body DNA
does not resolve the issue. It may be that the sense of genetic
privacy that one has in one’s out-of-body DNA does not rise to the
level of an expectation of privacy that society is willing to
recognize, as it did in the privacy “flowing” from the urine in
Skinner and as partially described in another mandatoryurinalysis case, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab:

489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989).
Id. at 617.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See generally Justin A. Alfano, Note, Look What Katz Leaves Out: Why DNA Collection
Challenges the Scope of the Fourth Amendment, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1017 (2005) (arguing
for an expansive view beyond bodily intrusion for what constitutes a search).
131
132
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There are few activities in our society more personal or
private than the passing of urine. Most people describe
it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a
function traditionally performed without public
observation; indeed, its performance in public is
generally prohibited by law as well as social custom.136
That consideration is the focus of Part V. Because courts
narrowly analyze surreptitious-harvesting cases, however, they
never reach that challenging core question.
D. THE LIMITED-USE-OF-INFORMATION FALLACY

One surreptitious-harvesting court briefly conducted an
analysis focused on a possible intrusion on personal information.
The Athan court concluded that Athan’s Fourth Amendment
privacy right was unaffected because the use by the police of his
out-of-body DNA was “narrowly limited to identification
David Kaye contends that the surreptitious
purposes.”137
harvesting of out-of-body DNA is, in the end, no different than the
harvesting of fingerprints left in public. One premise of his
contention is that the information obtained from standard 13-loci
STR DNA testing is of no greater personal dimension than that
obtained from fingerprints.138 That scientific contention has been
the focus of much of the debate about surreptitious harvesting
among some commentators.
This analytical approach suffers from the same narrow scope
that has plagued courts’ intrusion-on-property and intrusion-onbody analyses. If the analytical focus is on the individual’s
expectation of privacy rather than on the information itself, one
considers not only the information actually obtained by the police
but also the potential information that could be obtained by the
816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 34 (Wash. 2007). The court’s conclusion was contra an
assertion by an amicus—the ACLU—that out-of-body DNA “has the potential to reveal a
vast amount of personal information, including medical conditions and familial relations.”
Id.
138 Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 52, at 436–40; Kaye, supra note 38, at 64–65.
136
137
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practice and, by implication, an individual’s concern for its
potential use.
The Athan court and Professor Kaye essentially suggest that no
intrusion on an expectation of privacy occurs in a surreptitious
DNA harvesting because, like the fingerprint harvesting, the
information obtained is limited and can only be used in a very
limited way—for identification.139
This approach is inconsistent with Skinner and Kyllo. In Kyllo,
the thermal-imaging technology detected heat consistent with
growing marijuana with high-intensity lights.140 Still, Kyllo had a
reasonable expectation of privacy because of the potential of
thermal-imaging technology in general—of crude quality or
otherwise—to detect intimate details within the home.141 The
Court explicitly rejected “[l]imiting the prohibition of thermal
imaging to ‘intimate details.’ ”142 In Skinner, the Court confronted
a chemical test of urine for drugs and alcohol and said, “chemical
analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private
medical facts about an employee, including whether he or she is
epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.”143 The potential for intrusion on

139 Athan, 158 P.3d at 34; Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 52, at 436–40; Kaye, supra
note 49, at 71.
For the debate among Joh, Kaye, and Cole on the can-only-be-used issue, see supra note
51 and accompanying text.
140 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001).
141 The Court:
rejected such a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in
Katz, where the eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that
reached the exterior of the phone booth. Reversing that approach would
leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology—including
imaging technology that could discern all human activity in the home.
While the technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule
we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already
in use or in development.
Id. at 35–36.
142 Id. at 38. In doing so, it said that “[l]imiting the prohibition of thermal imaging to
‘intimate details’ would not only be wrong in principle; it would be impractical in
application, failing to provide ‘a workable accommodation between the needs of law
enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Id. (quoting Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984)).
143 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 602, 617 (1989).
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information created an expectation of privacy in Kyllo and in
Skinner.
Even if one only relies on the genetic nametag generated by the
standard 13-loci DNA testing—the genetic fingerprint—the
potential for intrusions on an individual’s expectation of privacy
expand beyond those associated with a fingerprint. For example,
the provisions of the Federal CODIS database legislation allow for
the inclusion of the DNA identification records of “other persons
whose DNA samples are collected under applicable legal
authorities, provided that DNA samples that are voluntarily
submitted solely for elimination purposes shall not be included in
the National DNA Index System.”144
This language suggests that one’s harvested genetic nametag
will appear in the Federal CODIS database as long as such
harvesting is constitutional. Once in the database, an “innocent”
individual may be the subject of a coincidental match with a crimescene sample, a match that would likely at least require
explanation or a partial match, a match that might lead to a courtauthorized search of the family members’ genetic profiles.145 That
individual may also be the subject of an erroneous match,
intentional or otherwise.146
More significantly, unlike the use of a DNA sample taken by
authorization of state or federal statute, the use of a
surreptitiously harvested sample is likely unregulated by
statute.147 It could be included in what has been referred to as

42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1)(C) (2006).
Frederick R. Bieber et al., Finding Criminals Through DNA of Their Relatives, 312
SCIENCE 1315, 1315–16 (2006); David R. Paoletti et al., Assessing the Implications for Close
Relatives in the Event of Similar but Nonmatching DNA Profiles, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 161,
162 (2006); Nakashima, supra note 5.
146 Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic
Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 892 (2005).
147 Joh, supra note 39, at 875–76. None of the database legislation collected at http://
www.aslme.org/dna_04/grid/statute_grid_4_5_2006.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2008) seems to
contain exclusivity provisions prohibiting collection of surreptitious and other samples for
inclusion in other, “off-line” databases. One Erie County, New York crime lab is
aggressively developing a database with samples from crime victims. Tom Precious, Crime
Lab Lambasted over DNA Databases; Policies Defended as Needed Both to Solve and
Prevent Crimes, BUFF. NEWS, May 21, 2006, at A1.
144
145
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either a “linkage” or “rogue” database of suspects’ or others’
profiles.148 The sample could be analyzed for information far
beyond that provided by the more standard 13-loci STR testing,
including not only skin pigmentation, bio-geographical origin,
gender, and eye color but also a host of medical diseases, medical
and behavioral predispositions, and perhaps even sexual
orientation.149
To be sure, no evidence currently exists that such analysis is
occurring. But, with the use of surreptitiously harvested samples
currently unregulated by the Constitution or otherwise, the
The question whether
specter of “function creep” looms.150
surreptitious harvesting of out-of-body DNA with these potential
uses intrudes on an expectation of privacy that society is willing to
recognize as reasonable is much more complex.
When the focus is properly on an intrusion upon privacy
instead, the scope of the analysis widens. The abandonment
question becomes whether an expectation of privacy is abandoned
rather than an object. The out-of-body status of surreptitiously
harvested DNA does not automatically resolve the reasonableexpectation-of-privacy question.
The very limited STR
identification information and its equally limited current use
expand into a much wider array of genetic information and uses.151
148 Richard Willing, Authorities Find More Uses for DNA Databases, USA TODAY (Mar. 26,
2007), available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-03-25-dna-databases-i
nside_n.htm.
149 See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 849–51 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (addressing potential scope of DNA identification given advancing technology);
Joh, supra note 39, at 876–79 (same); Laura A. Matejik, DNA Sampling: Privacy and Police
Investigation in a Suspect Society, 61 ARK. L. REV. 53, 59 (2009) (same).
150 Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California’s Proposition 69: A Dangerous
Precedent for Criminal DNA Databases, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 199, 201–04 (2006); Joh,
supra note 39, at 878–79.
151 An explanation of why courts have so consistently misapplied Katz in surreptitiousharvesting cases is slightly off topic, though related. At least three plausible explanations
exist for this overly narrow approach. (1) It seems like a fingerprint; some people call it
“DNA fingerprinting”; let’s treat it like a fingerprint. (2) All surreptitious harvesting cases
to date have involved what I have called putative suspects, i.e., someone for whom the
police have some suspicion but not enough to get a search warrant. It is plausible to believe
that, at least at an unconscious level, a judge has thought, “it’s not as if we’re talking about
the privacy of a ‘completely’ innocent person” and has allowed the bias to restrain
unconsciously the depth of the analysis. (3) The average layperson, including judges, likely
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A proper reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis must
consider the nature and scope of DNA or genetic privacy.
However, that expansion in focus does not automatically provide
an answer. Part V takes on the challenge of crafting a preliminary
sketch of an expectation of genetic privacy that society might be
willing to recognize as reasonable in these circumstances.
V. “AN EXPECTATION OF GENETIC PRIVACY . . .”
Crafting the sketch of Fourth Amendment genetic privacy is
complex. Privacy itself is a multi-dimensional, often amorphous
concept that has meant many different things to many different
people. Daniel Solove has suggested a number of different
conceptions that frequent legal and philosophical discourses about
privacy:
(1) the right to be let alone—Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis’s famous formulation of the right to privacy;
(2) limited access to the self—the ability to shield
oneself from unwanted access by others; (3) secrecy—
the concealment of certain matters from others; (4)
control over personal information—the ability to
exercise control over information about oneself; (5)
personhood—the protection of one’s personality,
individuality, and dignity; and (6) intimacy—control
over, or limited access to, one’s intimate relationships
or aspects of life.152

has little knowledge and even less understanding of the possible meanings of the genetic
information we are acquiring at a faster and faster rate. See Joh, supra note 39, at 865–69
(describing the characteristics of genetic information and how commentators have reacted
to the increased use of DNA in the court system, both of which could sway a judge to
misapply Katz in surreptitious-harvesting cases). To ask judges in that position to base
their judgment on an assessment of the nature and scope of genetic privacy, asks them to
accomplish a very difficult task.
152 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 12–13, (2008).
Solove argues
persuasively that none of these conceptions capture the common denominator of privacy, id.
at 14, and goes on to propose a “taxonomy of privacy” that seeks to provide a better
understanding of privacy, id. at 101–02.
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The Supreme Court has described the idea of constitutional
privacy from a number of perspectives beyond the formal confines of
the Fourth Amendment. The line of cases that includes Griswold v.
Connecticut (privacy and birth control), Roe v. Wade (privacy and
pregnancy termination) and Lawrence v. Texas (privacy and
consensual same-sex sexual activity) captures a view of privacy that
protects certain personal decisions and behavior from governmental
interference implicit in a number of constitutional amendments.153
Whalen v. Roe suggests a constitutional right to informational
privacy as a matter of due process.154 The cases flowing from the
Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on a compelled self-incrimination
effectively describe a privacy right grounded in one’s personal
dignity.155
Narrowing the sketch to one of genetic privacy only lessens the
complexity slightly. For example, one can readily conceive of some
aspect of genetic privacy fitting well into each of Solove’s six
“conceptions of privacy.”156 The Supreme Court has yet to directly
address genetic privacy as such, be it in informational, decisional–
behavioral, or dignitary privacy terms.157 Yet, as with the broader
conceptions of privacy, one can envision how genetic privacy
straddles some of the varieties of constitutional privacy—
informational, decisional–behavioral, or dignitary.

153 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding state law forbidding use
of contraceptives unconstitutional because it intruded upon right of marital privacy); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding right to privacy broad enough to encompass
woman’s decision whether to terminate pregnancy under Ninth or Fourteenth Amendment);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (holding state law criminalizing some
consensual same-sex sex acts unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment).
154 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1977) (recognizing Fourteenth Amendment
concerns over disclosure to state of prescriptions to certain drugs but ultimately holding no
violation of such rights or liberties).
155 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 457 (1966) (finding the interrogation environment
to be “destructive of human dignity”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 762 (1966)
(“[T]he constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government—
state or federal—must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.”).
156 SOLOVE, supra note 152.
157 Though, as a scientific matter, gender-discrimination cases are arguably geneticprivacy cases.
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As the Human Genome Project has unfolded, scholars from a
number of disciplines have taken on the challenge of describing
Bioethicists and moral
conceptions of genetic privacy.158
philosophers have considered the question in moral terms.159
Others have proposed model genetic-privacy legislation,160 and
legislators have passed numerous versions of such legislation.161
Researchers and health care professionals have wrestled with
practical applications of conceptions of genetic privacy.162 A
number of legal scholars have also addressed the issue.163
A broad assessment of what constitutional genetic privacy—let
alone genetic privacy in all its possible legal conceptions—might
look like and all the places where it might locate itself within the
Constitution is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, my focus
is only on the nature and scope of Fourth Amendment genetic
privacy, if any, implicated by the surreptitious harvesting of outof-body DNA and whether genetic privacy is something that
society is willing to recognize as reasonable.
Section V.B will
158 See generally Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in
GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31
(Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997) (discussing various definitions of “genetic privacy” and the
legal and ethical values of each).
159 See, e.g., Walther Ch. Zimmerli, Who Has the Right to Know the Genetic Constitution of
a Particular Person, in HUMAN GENETIC INFORMATION: SCIENCE, LAW, AND ETHICS 93
(Derek Chadwick et al., eds., 1990) (discussing genetic privacy from “information ethics”
point of view and suggesting perhaps under such view there is no right to private ownership
of any kind of information).
160 See generally GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., THE GENETIC PRIVACY ACT AND COMMENTARY
(1995) (proposing federal legislation to address the privacy concerns relating to genetic
information in light of the Human Genome Project).
161 See the National Conference of State Legislators’ website for a comprehensive catalog
of state-by-state genetic-privacy legislation, at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/
genetic-privacy-laws.aspx (last viewed Aug. 18, 2008).
162 See generally DOROTHY C. WERTZ ET AL., GUIDELINES ON ETHICAL ISSUES IN MEDICAL
GENETICS AND THE PROVISION OF GENETIC SERVICES (1995) (discussing genetic-privacy
issues in light of the Human Genome Initiative from the perspective of healthcare
professionals).
163 Several journals have dedicated symposium-style issues to the topic. E.g., Symposium,
Technological Innovation & Legal Tradition: Enduring Principles for Changing Times?, 4
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1 (1999) (discussing various viewpoints on the treatment of genetic
information); Symposium, Respecting Genetic Privacy: The ASU-58 Conference on Law,
Science, and Technology, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1999) (proposing a coherent theme for
genetic privacy).
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examine constitutional genetic privacy given Fourth Amendment
conceptions of physical privacy, informational privacy, and
dignitary privacy—the versions of privacy most implicated by a
conception of genetic privacy.
A. DIRECT FOURTH AMENDMENT GENETIC PRIVACY JURISPRUDENCE

Direct Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as to whether one has
an expectation of genetic privacy is limited. As a whole, it only
starts to outline some of the kinds of privacy concerns that a
robust portrait would include. For example, courts frequently
consider versions of bodily integrity, physical, property, and
informational privacy when confronted with a genetic-privacy
circumstance. A few courts also hint at an additional kind of less
tangible privacy at stake in genetic privacy cases—one that I will
later more fully identify as a dignitary-privacy concern.164 None
develop the full portrait of multi-dimensional genetic privacy.
Only two surreptitious-harvesting opinions came anywhere
close to addressing society’s conception of the reasonableness of an
expectation of genetic privacy. The Christian court found that the
defendant did not have an objective expectation of privacy in the
DNA “in the absence of any definitive authority to the contrary.”165
The Sigsbee court summarily dismissed the idea of any expectation
of privacy in bodily fluids (as opposed to one in the items upon
which the fluids existed): “such theory would prohibit any and all
testing upon items obtained from an individual regardless of
whether they were lawfully or unlawfully obtained. This is not
only an unacceptable premise but would be an unreasonable
extension of an individuals [sic] expectation of privacy absent any
legitimate constitutional basis.”166 Neither the Christian nor the
See infra Part V.B.3.
State v. Christian, No. 04-0900, 2006 WL 2419031, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2006).
The Athan court found “no inherent privacy interest in saliva” and chose not to address any
possible significant privacy interest in DNA because “the State’s use of Athan’s DNA here
was narrowly limited to identification purposes.” State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 33–34 (Wash.
2007).
166 People v. Sigsbee, No. 03-0342, slip op. at 33 (Onondaga, N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Oct. 30, 2003).
The Sigsbee court failed to appreciate that, even if one recognized an expectation of privacy
in one’s DNA that society was willing to recognize as reasonable, it would mean only that
164
165
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Sigsbee courts chose to characterize the nature or scope of society’s
conception of reasonable genetic privacy before dismissing the
idea.
Courts have also addressed at least the idea of a broad
conception of Fourth Amendment genetic privacy in the extensive
litigation surrounding the constitutionality of investigative genetic
databases. Because those cases always involve the collection of
samples via compelled body intrusion—Buccal swab or blood
sample—most of the courts do no formal Katz search analysis.167
Nonetheless, several genetic-database courts have taken the
opportunity in their analysis of the reasonableness of the search to
describe the nature of the privacy interest at stake when the
government acquires an individual’s DNA. Some courts have used
a totality-of-the-circumstances balancing test to assess the
reasonableness of the search involved in getting a blood or saliva
sample.168 That test asks the court to balance the nature of the
privacy interest at stake and the degree of intrusion on that
interest against the importance of the governmental interest at
stake.169
Not surprisingly, those genetic-database opinions that have
directly evaluated the nature of the privacy interest at stake often
conceptualized the interest as one grounded in well-established
privacy conceptions of bodily integrity or in information, or both.
Most commonly, genetic-database opinions focusing on bodily
integrity—the degree of physical intrusion into the body—
analogized the intrusion to that of taking blood, fingerprints, or
photographs.170 Some of those courts used those physical-intrusion
the police would be required to justify their search by showing probable cause or some other
quantum of evidence. It would not “prohibit any and all testing.” Id.
167 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102g(a)–(e) (West 2009) (compelling certain
offenders to give DNA samples).
168 E.g., United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 182–84 (3d Cir. 2005) (analyzing all
relevant facts to determine whether it is reasonable to demand that convict give DNA
sample).
169 Id. at 182; see Landry v. Att’y Gen., 709 N.E.2d 1085, 1090–92 (Mass. 1999) (holding
involuntary collection of DNA from persons convicted of certain crimes was not
unreasonable search and seizure because it involved little risk or pain and government’s
interest in making record of convicts was strong).
170 E.g., Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1342 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (“The bodily
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analogies as the sole basis for their conceptualization of genetic
privacy, and others used them in addition to information-intrusion
analogies. Both groups of courts found that an individual’s genetic
privacy had no greater scope than the kind of narrow physical
privacy at issue with drawing blood or taking fingerprints.171
The courts that focused primarily on an information conception
of genetic privacy also relied on analogies to other well-established
areas of privacy. Some spoke of the intrusion on information as
being like that which occurs in the taking of a fingerprint,172 and
others spoke more broadly of the intrusion being upon identity
information173—that the state was accessing either information
about an individual’s identity or the individual’s identity itself. In
either case, the courts’ conception of genetic privacy was onedimensional. The intrusion was upon the same kind of limited
identifying information as when the government fingerprinted an
individual. The conception of genetic privacy as information-based
had no greater scope or depth than that.
That these courts would view genetic privacy as having only
physical privacy or limited-information privacy dimensions is
unsurprising. The impetus to conceive of the full dimensions of
genetic privacy was abstract, at best. It occurred in the context of
a balancing test with components that were hard to quantify—

intrusion of taking a blood or saliva sample is minimal. It is not significantly greater than
taking fingerprints or a photograph.”).
171 Id.
172 See Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Use of DNA is in this respect no
different from use of a fingerprint; only the method of obtaining the information differs, and
for prisoners that is a distinction without importance.”); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336,
1340 (10th Cir. 1996) (approving “use of DNA in a manner not significantly different from
the use of fingerprints”); Vanderlinden v. Kansas, 874 F. Supp. 1210, 1215 (D. Kan. 1995)
(“[T]he court finds persuasive the . . . analogy of the blood and saliva gathering at issue here
to traditional identification techniques, such as fingerprinting.”); People v. Wealer, 636
N.E.2d 1129, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“[W]e consider the sampling mandated . . . as
functionally equivalent to fingerprinting . . . .”).
173 See, e.g., Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[L]ike
fingerprinting, collection of a DNA sample for purposes of identification implicates the
Fourth Amendment . . . .”); Miller v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1178 (D.
Kan. 2003) (“The DNA sample is used solely to provide identification information and that
purpose, and no other, is articulated in 42 U.S.C. § 14135e. DNA identification is often
likened to a fingerprint. While some differences exist, they are both identity markers.”).
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governmental interest, nature of privacy interest,174 and degree of
intrusion. The courts were assessing statutory structures that,
superficially, had all the appearances of earlier physicalcharacteristic collections of information for identification purposes
only, like photographs and fingerprints.175
What is more surprising are the genetic-database opinions that
showed some signs of breaking from the classic, narrow physicalintrusion and information-intrusion paradigms in an effort to give
fuller dimension to the concept of genetic privacy. In some
instances, these courts merely considered and then rejected a
fuller conception of genetic privacy. In Nicholas v. Goord, the
Second Circuit expressed an awareness of the potential for a more
significant intrusion on privacy because database samples were
kept permanently: “it is potentially a far greater intrusion than
the initial extraction of DNA, since the state analyzes DNA for
information and maintains DNA records indefinitely.”176 The court
then concluded that the potential intrusion was unlikely given the
procedural safeguards of New York’s database statute that limited
the use of the samples.177
A few genetic-database opinions have sketched some of the
fuller dimensions of genetic privacy. Those sketches include a
174 Note also that the privacy interest at stake belonged to one convicted of a crime. As all
the courts that used the balancing test recognized, one convicted of a crime has a
diminished expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306–07 (4th
Cir. 1992) (“With . . . arrest comes the loss of at least some, if not all, rights to personal
privacy otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment.”); Landry, 709 N.E.2d at 1094
(“[C]onvicted persons . . . have a low expectation of privacy in their identity. . . .”).
175 See Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Today, however, the DNA
Act applies only to felons, and CODIS operates much like an old-fashioned fingerprint
database (albeit more efficiently).”).
176 430 F.3d 652, 670 (2d Cir. 2005).
177 Id.; see also State v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 40 n.17 (Md. 2004) (“Although Appellee and
the amici speak of doomsday type scenarios where every person’s, including non-convicts’,
DNA would be subject to search by both police and unauthorized persons and soon would be
subject to nearly unregulated access, the current version of the Maryland DNA Collection
Act does not even approach such unregulated access to DNA profiles.”).
Other courts have acknowledged at least the possibility of a broader conception of
genetic privacy. Quander, 440 F.3d at 499–500 (a Kyllo analogy); Padgett v. Donald, 401
F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2005) (an analogy to female guards watching naked men); State
ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. Orozco, 878 P.2d 432, 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing that
blood-testing may be a “greater insult to human dignity than fingerprinting”).
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much expanded sense of the breadth and depth of the available
genetic information and a preliminary identification of elements of
genetic privacy that are grounded in more than just its
information-laden status. Those sketches portray a sense that
fully dimensioned genetic privacy is of a different character than
the privacy attendant to fingerprinting, photographing, and
traditional blood testing.
In Patterson v. State, an Indiana appellate court found that “[a]t
a minimum, it is clear that the results of DNA analysis provide
extremely personal information about an individual” even though
it upheld the constitutionality of the genetic-database statute.178
In his concurrence in United States v. Kincade, Judge Gould, after
harkening back to Brandeis and Warren’s seminal article on the
right to privacy, expressed deep concern about the potential abuse
of information obtained from DNA:
In our age in which databases can be “mined” in a
millisecond using super-fast computers, in which
extensive information can, or potentially could, be
gleaned from DNA (even the “junk” DNA currently
used), and in which this data can easily be stored and
shared by governments and private parties worldwide,
the threat of a loss of privacy is real, even if we cannot
yet discern the full scope of the problem.179
In a federal district court opinion later overturned by the First
Circuit, Judge Young articulated a sense of genetic privacy that
went beyond the tangible boundaries of information and bodily
integrity:
Today this Court faces the latest iteration in the
growing tension between technology’s ability to
advance governmental purposes and the Fourth
Amendment's protection of individual privacy. This
tension is faced and resolved by balancing the
178
179

Patterson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 4, 10 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
379 F.3d 813, 842 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Gould, J., concurring).
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government’s purpose against the resulting intrusion
on the individual. When conducting such a balancing
test, the immediate and tangible imperatives of the
governmental purpose often outshine and eclipse the
more telescopic and inchoate value of personal privacy.
The willingness to watch the erosion of such rights
silently is most likely where the vanishing liberties are
perceived as not our own. It is even more acute where
the subjects are those who have derided and evaded,
through criminal misconduct, the order and legal
structure on which they now rely.180
In an earlier case, also reversed by the First Circuit, Judge Keeton
had characterized the information obtained in DNA database
searches as “immensely private.”181
More dramatically, in his dissent in the en banc decision in
United States v. Kincade, Judge Reinhardt wrote expansively
about the core upon which DNA testing intruded:
Yet the current CODIS database, when it is compared
to its modest beginnings, represents an
alarming trend whereby the privacy and
dignity of our citizens [are] being whittled
away by [ ] imperceptible steps. Taken
individually, each step may be of little
consequence. But when viewed as a whole,
there begins to emerge a society quite
unlike any we have seen—a society in which

180 United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 282 (D. Mass. 2007) (emphasis added),
rev’d, 532 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2008). The First Circuit did not reject Judge Young’s
characterization of the privacy interest at stake. It rejected the result of his balancing. 532
F.3d at 33–34.
181 United States v. Weikert, 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 269 (D. Mass. 2006), rev’d, 504 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 2007). The court said: “Not only is the information itself thus immensely private,
but the means of storing this information in a centralized database that could potentially be
accessed for improper reasons is itself a significant intrusion on privacy interests.” Id.
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government may intrude into the secret
regions of man's life at will.182
“The more telescopic and inchoate value of personal privacy,”
“immensely private,” “privacy and dignity” and “the secret regions
of man’s life” all speak of a dimension to genetic privacy in
addition to the physical or the informational—one identifiable as a
dignitary—privacy dimension. The dimension of dignitary privacy
captures a much more intangible sense of violation caused by the
repeated intrusion on one’s DNA that occurs in genetic-database
circumstances.
Taken together, the physical integrity,
informational, and dignitary perspectives on privacy revealed by
genetic-database cases form the core components of a fully
dimensioned portrait of genetic privacy worthy of evaluation in the
surreptitious harvesting of out-of-body DNA circumstance.
B. CONCEPTUAL COMPONENTS OF GENETIC PRIVACY

A focus on physical, informational, and dignitary privacy
returns us to Solove’s six summary conceptions of privacy: the
right to be let alone, limited access to the self, secrecy, the control
of personal information, personhood, and intimacy.183 These
conceptions each contemplate the protection of some core. As
Solove suggests with his “taxonomy of privacy,” the protected core
of privacy lies within the circumstance at hand rather than in a
single normative standard good for all purposes.184 Inevitably, it
varies from circumstance to circumstance. So, the protected core
at stake in a home invasion would differ from that in a cyber
invasion or in a sodomy prosecution.
In the particular circumstance of surreptitious harvesting, the
protected core is what I call a kaleidoscope of identity—a
constantly changing pattern of elements that define one’s sense of
self. This sense is physical in that DNA is within the body or a

182 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 851 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (emphasis
added) (quoting Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 343 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
183 SOLOVE, supra note 152.
184 Id. at 8–9.
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part of the body—a cell; it is ubiquitous in that it is in every cell; it
is permanent; and it is relatively immutable. The sense of self is
informational in that DNA contains a broad range of medical and
other information—information that is personal, predictive,
intimate, powerful, and shared. This sense is dignitary in that
DNA contains the kind and quality of information and is so
ubiquitous that, in the hands of the government, it may reveal
more about who individuals are than they themselves will ever
know.
In the case law and in public discourse, DNA is often referred to
as a “code,”185 a “map,”186 a “language,”187 and a “library”188 to
mention a few.
These metaphors capture the predictive,
information-laden sense of identity contained within DNA. One
might even broaden those metaphors to call DNA an encyclopedia
of identity that can be consulted repeatedly over time.
The kaleidoscope metaphor most fully captures the multidimensional nature of the identity that DNA embodies. Identity
itself has many components—physical, informational, and
dignitary to mention only a few. It can be socially constructed. It
can be grounded in the physical and measurable. It can depend on
the perception of others. It can come from one’s own internal
perception grounded in life experience and may even exist in spite
of either what others think or what much of the information
“says.”
Who one is changes over time. One’s hair grays or disappears.
One’s posture and physical bearing alter. One’s personality,
malleable as it is or isn’t, evolves over time in response to internal
and external events—physical and emotional, voluntary, and
involuntary. One interacts with the environment in innumerable
ways and the world’s perception—and one’s own—of who one is
185 E.g., THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME
PROJECT 60 (Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy Hood eds., 1992).
186 E.g., BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, GENETIC MAPS AND HUMAN IMAGINATIONS: THE LIMITS
OF SCIENCE IN UNDERSTANDING WHO WE ARE 189 (1998).
187 E.g., FRANCIS S. COLLINS, THE LANGUAGE OF LIFE: DNA AND THE REVOLUTION IN
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 6 (1st ed. 2010).
188 E.g., KEVIN DAVIES, CRACKING THE GENOME: INSIDE THE RACE TO UNLOCK HUMAN
DNA 33 (2001).
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depends where one looks and the resolution of that focus. The
kaleidoscopic nature of identity mirrors the dynamic, multidimensional core of genetic privacy.
1. Physical Privacy. The term “physical privacy” encompasses
at least three, often overlapping, versions of the physical. It can
refer to the body or bodily integrity—my body is private to me. It
can refer to a sense of location—the physical location means it is
private. It can also refer to a sense of tangibleness or even
property—this physical item is mine and you can’t have it or go in
it. The language of the Fourth Amendment itself captures
elements of each of these in its list of examples: “The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . .”189
The crux of the rejection of surreptitious harvesting as a search
is that the samples retrieved are outside the individual’s body. In
the language of those cases, one can hear the echoes of the three
versions of physical privacy.
[W]hen the defendant discarded the straw he also
discarded any expectation of privacy in the DNA
evidence on the straw. While it is unlikely that the
defendant believed that he was discarding bodily fluids
that would show his DNA profile, nonetheless . . . .190
In any event, we believe the same abandonment
analysis applies equally to the items seized or the shed
DNA samples obtained from them.191
The relevant question in this case is whether, when a
person licks an envelope and places it in the mail, that

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
People v. Sigsbee, No. 03-0342, slip op. at 31–32 (Onondaga, N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Oct. 30,
2003) (emphasis added).
191 State v. Christian, No. 04-0900, 2006 WL 2419031, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2006)
(emphasis added).
189
190
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person retains any privacy interest in his saliva at
all.192
Our conclusion that Bly had no subjective expectation
of privacy is compelled not by a finding that he legally
abandoned them as much as it is by his wholesale
failure to manifest any expectation of privacy in the
items whatsoever.193
The fact that the DNA was not in the individual’s body, that it was
abandoned, or that it was placed in the mail resolved the matter
for each of these courts.
That analytical crux depends on one’s conception of the physical
and what is being searched. If one conceives the search to be of
the cup, cigarette butt, saliva, or blood that is outside the body,
then DNA’s out-of-body status matters. One does not enter the
physical boundaries of the body if one enters the cup, blood, or
saliva. An individual most often knowingly abandons such items
and bodily fluids and would likely have no expectation of privacy
in them.
If one conceives of the locus of intrusion as one’s DNA, the
calculus changes. If “entry” of the physical boundaries of the body
occurs when one enters one’s DNA to obtain what will become the
alphanumeric identification tag used in forensic DNA analysis,
then it is an intrusion. Or, if one is mining that which ordinarily
exists in the traditional boundaries of the body—DNA—without
entering the body, then it is an intrusion.
In and of itself, the proposition that any entry of out-of-body
DNA or an out-of-body cell constitutes an intrusion into the body
appears to stretch credulity. It would seem to expand the
boundaries of what constitutes the body beyond that which is
either practical or sensible.
Yet such a seemingly novel conception may not be so farfetched. As discussed previously, the Kyllo Court found that the
search of a location—a home—occurred even though the home was
192
193

State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 33 (Wash. 2007) (emphasis added).
Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341, 357 (Mass. 2007) (emphasis added).
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never entered.194 The analogy between using thermal-imaging
technology to discern activity within the home and using forensicDNA technology to discern what is in the body is imperfect. Both
circumstances recognize that an intrusion can occur without
crossing a traditional physical boundary.
Other physical-privacy cases focusing on the location of that
which is searched buttress the suggestion that neither traditional
physical boundaries nor location necessarily resolve the Fourth
Amendment issue. In United States v. Chadwick, the Supreme
Court analyzed a situation in which the police were legally in
possession of a car and legally inside the car. Therein, they
discovered a double-locked trunk.195 The police removed the trunk
from the car; transported it to a federal facility and then opened it
without a warrant, finding marijuana inside.196 The Court found
that the police should not have opened the trunk without a
warrant.197
In California v. Acevedo, a 1991 follow-up to Chadwick, the
police stopped a car with probable cause to believe contained a bag
In effectively overruling
with marijuana in the trunk.198
Chadwick, the Court found that the police could search the
container within the car without a warrant as long as they had
probable cause to search that container.199
The analogy to surreptitious harvesting is direct, though
perhaps not intuitive. When the police seized the envelope in
Athan, they seized the Chadwick–Acevdo car. When they removed
the saliva from the envelope, they seized the Chadwick–Acevdo
container. When they entered the cell to extract the DNA, they
searched the trunk in Chadwick and the bag in Acevedo.
This analogy also extends to more technologically sophisticated
circumstances. In cell phone cases, courts have found that the
phone’s owner has an expectation of privacy in the contents of the
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–36 (2001).
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565 (1991).
196 Id. at 4–5.
197 Id. at 15–16.
198 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 567.
199 Id. at 580–81.
194
195
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phone.200 For example, in State v. Smith, the police arrested
Smith and found a cell phone in his possession.201 The police
searched the cell phone and discovered call records and phone
numbers of value to their investigation.202 The Ohio Supreme
Court found that Smith had a protected privacy interest in the
contents of his cell phone and declined to apply the searchincident-to-arrest exception, finding that the police should have
obtained a warrant.203
The analogy to surreptitious harvesting is direct. For example,
when the police seized the envelope in Athan, they seized the
defendant in Smith. When they removed the saliva from the
envelope, they seized the Smith cell phone. When they entered the
saliva and its cells to extract the DNA, they searched the contents
of the cell phone in Smith.
The import of the Chadwick–Acevedo and Smith analogies is
plain. If there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the DNA
obtained from the search of the saliva and cells in Athan as the
courts found in the contents of the trunk, bag, and cell phones in
those cases, then the police must have probable cause and,
depending on the circumstances, a warrant to search for DNA in
surreptitious harvesting cases.
Those analogies hold only if a reasonable expectation of privacy
in one’s DNA is as merited as a reasonable expectation of privacy
in a double-locked trunk (Chadwick), a bag (Acevedo), or a cell
phone (Smith). A double-locked trunk speaks of a heightened,
proactive sense of security, a paper bag less so. A cell phone may
or may not have security features, though it appears that the

200 United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Finley, 477
F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (M.D.
Fla. 2009); United States v. Morales–Ortiz, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1139 (D. N.M. 2004);
State v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1075 (Conn. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1474 (2011). But
see United States v. Mercado–Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1276 (D. Kan. 2007) (“Mere
physical possession or control of property is not sufficient to establish standing to object to a
search of that property.” (quoting United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 444, 444–46 (10th Cir.
1990))).
201 State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 950 (Ohio 2009).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 955.
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phone in Smith had the kind of security that prevented ready
scrolling by the police.
Physically, the surreptitious harvesting search is a search for
an otherwise inaccessible item and one at the core of one’s physical
being. For STR testing, the forensic scientist must isolate the
DNA molecules from other cellular materials,204 remove any
possible inhibitors to the PCR process,205 and quantitate the DNA
to make sure it is from a human subject.206 The analyst then
amplifies the DNA so that enough exists for analysis207 and
transforms the fluorescently labeled DNA into an image on an
electropherogram.208 Only then can the analyst analyze the DNA
in the original sample. The unlocking of the cellular “trunk” or
scrolling of the “cellular” phone is a sophisticated molecular
biological process using, for example, chemicals, enzymes, thermal
cyclers, and DNA templates.209
Yet, as inaccessible as DNA is, it is equally ubiquitous. It is in
every cell in the human body, whether that cell is a part of skin,
The “item” for
bodily fluids, hair root, living bone, etc.210
surreptitious-harvesting searches is also at the physical core of
every human being. It is in the nucleus of the cell and is a
physical starting point for life itself, yet obtaining it through
surreptitious harvesting causes no pain.211
Inaccessibility, ubiquity, and existence as a core part of the
body are the essential physical privacy features of DNA. Unlike
the Chadwick–Acevedo circumstance, the inaccessibility is
passive.212 The “double-lock” naturally exists, albeit with many
BUTLER, supra note 16, at 42.
Id. at 49.
206 Id. at 50.
207 Id. at 63.
208 Id. at 330.
209 See generally id. (explaining the process of forensic DNA typing as applied to criminal
forensics).
210 Id. at 17, 34.
211 Contrast this kind of search to the one in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758
(1966), where the police, via a physician, obtained a blood sample from a DUI suspect, or to
the one in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 756 (1985), where the police, via a surgeon, sought
to surgically remove a bullet from the body of an attempted robbery suspect.
212 Unlike a locked trunk, a closed purse, or a bag in a car trunk, the hyper-inaccessibility
204
205
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more locks of much greater technological sophistication. Its
ubiquity is unique, and its existence as part of the body’s core is,
oddly, not dependent on whether it is within or outside the body.
The fingerprint analogy presents an interesting contrast.
Fingerprints, though permanent like DNA, are neither
inaccessible nor at the body’s core. They exist only on the outside
of the body and are literally superficial—on one’s fingertips. A
forensic scientist must use a measure of discipline and attention to
detail to develop a fingerprint from an individual’s fingers, let
alone from a crime scene.213 But the technological or biological
sophistication necessary to obtain a fingerprint is much less than
that required for DNA.
They are, in measure, ubiquitous in that everyone has them
and they are found on all ten fingers. However, they possess none
of the biological ubiquity of DNA. In terms of the physical privacy
features, then, fingerprints are not comparable to DNA given
DNA’s inaccessibility, ubiquity, and existence at the physical core
of a human.
That conclusion does not resolve with finality the fingerprint–
DNA comparison though. What fingerprints and DNA most share
in common is that they both contain valuable identifying
information. Much of the identifying utility of both fingerprints
and DNA comes from the nature of the information. However,
some of it comes from the physical location or existence of the
information. Fingerprints are valuable for identification purposes
because (1) they contain information from the tips of fingers—
accessible, common to every human, and permanent and (2) that
information is considered “unique.”214 Thus, the surrounding
physical context for the unique information is an essential
predicate to their identifying power.
of DNA is not an active step taken by an individual. Some might argue that this militates
against a finding of a subjective expectation of privacy.
213 See generally SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND
CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2001) (explaining the complexity of the fingerprint identification
process).
214 Putting aside recent litigation surrounding fingerprints. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 26–28 (Mass. 2005) (comparing the degrees to which different
fingerprinting analysis techniques reliably identify an individual).
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The same is true with DNA. Its physical privacy features—
inaccessibility, ubiquity, and existence at the body’s core—provide
the physical context within which its identifying value becomes
powerful. Put differently, it is not just about the substance of the
information, but it is also about the physical context within which
it exists. And one’s identity—part of one’s dignity—also gets
additional meaning from the physical context. An examination of
the informational- and dignitary-privacy aspects of surreptitious
harvesting will thus fill in the developing portrait of the
kaleidoscope of identity.
2. Informational Privacy. The informational privacy features of
DNA are the most prominent colors in the genetic-privacy
kaleidoscope of identity. Information from DNA analysis can be
intimate, personal, shared, predictive, and powerful. To the extent
that one’s identity is captured by a composite of data, the DNA
from surreptitious harvesting captures the full breadth of that
informational dimension of identity.
The informational-privacy dimension of DNA has been the
primary focus of the genetic-database case law on genetic privacy.
Though every court has, in the end, declined to act based on the
informational-privacy features of DNA,215 many of them have
highlighted its potential.
The classic description of DNA’s
informational value is Judge Reinhardt’s dissent in United States
v. Kincade:
What type of information might the government
eventually be able to extract from samples of junk
DNA? Even today, as the plurality admits, “DNA
profiles derived by STR may yield probabilistic
215 The courts have arrived at this conclusion because (1) the information obtained for
inclusion in a genetic database is alphanumeric and one-dimensional and (2) the use of that
limited information is strictly controlled by statute. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d
652, 668 (2d Cir 2005) (observing that “junk DNA” serves no known purpose other than to
establish identity); State v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 33 (Md. 2004) (dismissing fears of
“unregulated access to DNA profile[s]”); State v. Martin, 955 A.2d 1144, 1155 (Vt. 2008)
(noting that database indexes genes “not associated with any known physical trait”); State
v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 34 (Wash. 2007) (acknowledging potential for privacy violations with
DNA information). In the surreptitious-harvesting circumstance, neither the state nor the
federal government appears to regulate the information obtained.
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evidence of the contributor’s race or sex.” Yet that
seems to be a dramatic understatement. The DNA
“fingerprint” entered into CODIS likely has the
potential to reveal information about an individual's
“genetic defects, predispositions to diseases, and
perhaps even sexual orientation.” DNA analysis can
reveal the presence of traits for thousands of known
diseases, and countless numbers of diseases which are
currently unknown.
More ominously, some have
predicted that the DNA profiles entered into CODIS
will someday be able to predict the likelihood that a
given individual will engage in certain types of
criminal, or non-criminal but perhaps socially
disfavored, behavior.216
In his dissent in Rise v. Oregon, Judge Nelson also highlighted the
particularly sensitive nature of the information in DNA: “DNA
genetic pattern analysis catalogs uniquely private genetic facts
about the individual that should be subject to rigorous
confidentiality requirements even broader than the protection of
an individual’s medical records.”217 In United States v. Weikert,
Judge Keeton further characterized a genetic database as one in
which “the files that are kept for perpetuity are replete with
information the scope of which science has not yet discovered.”218
The case law thus describes DNA as containing: (1) information
about genetic defects, predispositions to diseases, perhaps sexual
orientation, the presence of traits for thousands of known diseases,
and countless numbers of diseases which are currently unknown;
(2) possible predictive information about certain types of criminal,
or noncriminal but perhaps socially disfavored, behavior; (3) more
generally, information of the most sensitive and personal nature
216 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 850 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
217 59 F.3d 1556, 1569 (9th Cir. 1995) (Nelson, J., dissenting), abrogated by City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), and Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S.
67 (2001).
218 United States v. Weikert, 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 269 (D. Mass. 2006), rev’d, 504 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 2007).
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and a catalog of uniquely private genetic facts more than akin to
those facts contained in medical records.
This cascade of information is only a relatively small window
into the body of new information flowing from recent genetic
research. For purposes of a focus on genetic privacy, the salient
features of the information flowing from that research are that it
is intimate, personal, shared, predictive, and powerful.
a. Predictive. The predictive nature of genetic information
is notable. One of the fundamental features of genetic information
is its probabilistic nature. For example, genetic disorders are
rarely controlled by a single gene that necessarily causes the
disorder.219 Most information flowing from a genetic analysis,
particularly as to medical conditions, is predictive rather than
certain. For example, the variants of the “breast cancer gene” that
have been identified as causing cancer only inform carriers such a
variant that they have an increased likelihood (five-fold) over the
course of their lifetime of developing breast cancer as compared to
the general population.220
Predictive genetic information comes in many shapes, sizes, and
degrees of certainty. While newspaper headlines frequently
trumpet the discovery of the “gene for . . .,” more often what has
been located is a gene that correlates to the presence of a medical
disorder, a trait, or a behavior.221 For example, scientists have
developed correlations between genes and obesity,222 risk-taking,223

219 NHS NAT’L GENETICS EDUC. & DEV. CTR., Single Gene Disorder, http://www.geneticsed
ucation.nhs.uk/teaching-genetics/glossary/single-gene-disorder.aspx (last visited Sept. 23,
2012). A notable exception is Huntington’s disease. NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO.,
Huntington’s Disease, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001775/ (last
visited Aug. 17, 2011).
220 NAT’L CANCER INST., BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, http://
www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA (last visited Aug. 17, 2011).
221 See generally GISELA KAPLAN & LESLEY J. ROGERS, GENE WORSHIP: MOVING BEYOND
THE NATURE/NUTURE DEBATE OVER GENES, BRAIN, AND GENDER (2003) (critiquing the
frequent genetic explanations for human behavior).
222 Alan Herbert et al., A Common Genetic Variant Is Associated with Adult and
Childhood Obesity, 312 SCIENCE 279, 279 (2006).
223 Chin-Hsing Lin et al., The Dosage of the NeuroD2 Transcription Factor Regulates
Amygdala Development and Emotional Learning, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 14877, 14879
(2005).
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smoking,224 creative dance,225 schizophrenia,226 and impulsivity
and violence.227
DeCODE Genetics, an international biotechnology research
company in Iceland, advertises diagnostic tests for a variety of
genetic conditions on its website, including tests for obesity,
common forms of breast cancer, prostate cancer, glaucoma,
elevated cholesterol, as well as hypertension and cardiac risk.228
Its most comprehensive test is a personal genetic scan,
deCODEme, that “analyses genetic risk factors for 48 diseases
ranging from heart attack and diabetes to lung cancer and traits
like ABO bloodtypes, eye color and male pattern baldness.”229
Other companies like 23andME offer similar services, attracting
customers with the promise of personalized genetics.230
To be sure, genetic information about physical traits or
conditions can be certain. Forensic tests for eye color, hair color,
and other traits continue to be developed in an effort to provide
investigators with a hazy physical portrait of a potential suspect
drawn from a crime scene sample.231 In terms of informational
privacy concerns, though, predictive genetic information provides a
future window into an individual’s life. George Annas has
eloquently labeled predictive genetic information a “future diary”
that “informs our younger selves about our aging selves.”232
224 V. Malaiyandi et al., Impact of CYP2A6 Genotype on Pretreatment Smoking Behaviour
and Nicotine Levels from and Usage of Nicotine Replacement Therapy, 11 MOLECULAR
PSYCHIATRY 400, 400 (2006).
225 Rachel Bachner–Melman et al., AVPR1a and SLC6A4 Gene Polymorphisms Are
Associated with Creative Dance Performance, 1 PLOS GENETICS 394, 394 (2005).
226 Vladimir Vacic et al., Duplications of the Neuropeptide Receptor Gene VIPR2 Confer
Significant Risk for Schizphrenia, 471 NATURE 499, 499 (2011).
227 Andreas Meyer–Lindenberg et al., Neural Mechanisms of Genetic Risk for Impulsivity
and Violence in Humans, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI., http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.
0511311103 (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
228 DECODE GENETICS, http://www.decode.com/products/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2011).
229 Id.
230 23ANDME, http://www.23andme.com/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). 23andMe uses the
catch phrase, “Genetics just got personal.”
231 TONY
N. FRUDAKIS, MOLECULAR PHOTOFITTING: PREDICTING ANCESTRY AND
PHENOTYPE USING DNA 613 (2008).
232
It is in code and probabilistic, but just as private. It is information about
you, information about which you should have a right not to know, a right
to say, “I don't want to know this.” But even if you want to know it, you
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b. Shared. Genetic information is also shared information.
Because genetic information is hereditary, the DNA of blood
relatives is more similar than that of the unrelated population.
For example, with paternity testing, laboratories compare the
DNA of a putative parent and child to determine possible
parentage.233 One begins to know to whom one is related when one
is in possession of an individual’s DNA. As noted above, this
proposition has formed the basis for the activities of amateur
genealogists, divorce lawyers, and DNA paparazzi.234
Prosecutors have also begun to use genetic information taken
from DNA more creatively. Based on the work of Mark Shriver
and others, tests exist to discern bio-geographical information from
DNA—testing that purports to identify, at least, the continent of
origin of the human source of the sample.235 For example, a serial
murder case in Louisiana changed direction based on biogeographical testing that directed the police to a non-Caucasian
suspect rather than a Caucasian suspect.236
Even more recently, the police and prosecutors have engaged in
a practice known as familial searching—an outgrowth of the
compilation of state-by-state and federal databases containing 13loci genetic information on those convicted of certain crimes. The
police submit the 13-loci genetic profile of the crime-scene sample

should have a right to say, “I don't want anybody else to know it. I don't
want my employer to know it. I don’t want the FBI to know it. I don’t want
my school to know it. I don’t want my colleagues to know it. I don’t want
my spouse to know it. I don’t want my children to know it.” It should be
your choice. . . . [I]n terms of information, I believe that our DNA resembles
a future diary that is due the same privacy that we afford other written
diaries.
George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy: There Ought To Be a Law, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
9, 11 (1999).
233 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 53–54
(1996).
234 See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic
Stalking and Voyeurism: A New Challenge to Privacy, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 539 (2009)
(discussing uses and publication of genetic information and recommending legislation).
235 FRUDAKIS, supra note 231, at 35–145.
236 Nicholas Wade, Unusual Use of DNA Aided in Serial Killer Search, N.Y. TIMES, June
3, 2003, at A28.
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of unknown origin into the CODIS database.237
Sometimes, the
search produces a partial match in which the sample of unknown
origin matches the sample of known origin at, most often, six or
more loci but not all.238 Such a result strongly suggests that the
individual who contributed the crime-scene sample is closely
related to the individual in the database.239
The prosecution then seeks a search warrant to get a blood
sample from relevant relatives of the database individual, basing
their claim of probable cause on the suggestive partial match.240
These examples confirm that genetic information from DNA tells
others not only information about who you are—physically and
going forward—but also to whom you are related and to what
ancestral groups you belong. Genetic information is shared
information that is identifying both at an individuating level—to
whom you “belong”—and at a group-membership level—you belong
with them.
c. Personal and Intimate.
Because it contains both
predictive and shared information, DNA information is also
personal and intimate. As a present and future diary, it catalogs
knowledge about, for example, current and possible future medical
conditions that an individual could otherwise choose to disclose.
Therein lies much of the basis for the genetic-privacy laws that so
many states have passed.
Strikingly, someone in possession of others’ DNA would be able
to learn information about them that they do not know about
themselves.
Consider the circumstance in which a genetic
counselor becomes aware that a couple’s child only has a genetic
relationship to one of the parents. The personal and intimate
nature of such information in the hands of a third party is
apparent. And note that in the context of Fourth Amendment

237 Jules Epstein, “Genetic Surveillance”—The Bogeyman Response to Familial DNA
Investigations, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 141, 145.
238 Id. at 146.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 145–46.
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genetic privacy, the third party with that knowledge would be the
government.241
d. Powerful. The predictive, shared, personal, and intimate
nature of genetic information also makes it powerful. The degree
of that power is reflected in the variety of laws passed to rein in its
abuse. Most states now have genetic antidiscrimination laws in
the provision of health insurance.242 A number of states have such
laws addressing the employment context,243 and genetic-privacy
laws are quite common.244
Even pseudo-genetic information has had power, historically.
The eugenics era in this and other countries in the first part of the
twentieth century is a vivid and painful historical reminder of the
power of genetic information.
Hundreds of thousands of
individuals were sterilized based on pseudo-genetic information.245
Carrie Buck, the subject of the infamous Buck v. Bell case
upholding the constitutionality of involuntary sterilization,246 was
committed to the Virginia Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded,
in Lynchburg and involuntarily sterilized because she, her mother,
and her daughter were believed to be “feebleminded,” then viewed
as a hereditary condition.247
The scope of eugenic legislation went beyond involuntary
sterilization statutes. More than twenty-five states revised their
marriage laws to prevent the “biological continuation” of the
unfit.248 Immigration restrictions were passed that used “IQ” tests

241 It is critical, once again, to recognize in this discussion of what is genetic privacy that
the focus is on the individuals’ expectation of privacy in their DNA, not on their level of
certainty as to whether the government has or would access such information or what the
government would do with such information if it had or did access the information.
242 Nancy E. Kass, The Implications of Genetic Testing for Health and Life Insurance, in
GENETIC SECRETS, supra note 158, at 299, 312–13.
243 Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workplace, in
GENETIC SECRETS, supra note 158, at 281, 291–93.
244 E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H (“[N]o individual . . . shall be required to undergo
genetic testing as a condition of doing business with another person.”).
245 See DANIEL KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN
HEREDITY 100 (1985) (discussing introduction of sterilization laws in the United States).
246 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
247 KEVLES, supra note 245, at 110–11.
248 Id. at 99–100.
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to restrict immigration, particularly of Eastern and Southern
Europeans.249
***
The powerful, intimate, personal, predictive, and shared nature
of information from DNA—its multi-dimensional informational
quality—contrasts sharply with the one-dimensional quality of the
information flowing from fingerprints. Fingerprint information is
unique but unshared—no two people have the same fingerprints.
It has no predictive value of which anyone is aware. The
information it provides is neither intimate nor personal in the
nature.
Fingerprints share one aspect with DNA information: its
identifying power. Like forensic DNA information, fingerprints
can identify the source of a crime-scene sample and is a potent
investigative tool when available. Otherwise, it is profoundly onedimensional, quite different from the multi-dimensional cascade of
DNA information.250
DNA’s multi-dimensional cascade is also profoundly identifying.
To the extent that at least some of one’s identity can be captured
by a matrix of data, data from DNA does that. The cascade of
data—about physical features, medical conditions and
predispositions, behavioral conditions and predispositions,
ancestry, relatedness and group membership etc.—substantially
enriches the image of the kaleidoscope of identity at the core of
genetic privacy.
A set of distorting concepts accompanies the association of
genetic information with identity.
One is the risk of the
“geneticization” of identity—you are your disease(s) or you are
your genes.251 Associated risks are those of genetic determinism—
your genes determine who you are—and genetic essentialism—
Id. at 94–95.
Interestingly, while fingerprints can be obliterated to some extent by physical
mutilation, DNA cannot, thereby lending it an informational permanence akin to its
physical permanence.
251 See Jennifer Fitzgerald, Geneticizing Disability: The Human Genome Project and the
Commodification of Self, 14 ISSUES L. & MED. 147, 153 (1998) (arguing that wealth of
genetic information discovered by Human Genome Project could intensify risk that people
with disabilities will have their identity reduced to disease or disability).
249
250
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what your genes say about you is all we need to know about you.252
And the risk of genetic exceptionalism completes the list of
concepts attending to the association of genetic information with
identity.
The identity features of genetic information are different from
these concepts. Genetic information tells us something about who
one is. It does not tell us about the essence of a person253 to the
exclusion of other components of identity, be it the social
construction of identity or one’s own sense of who one is.
The construction of identity is a complex, layered phenomenon
that resists essentialist simplicity. Anthropologists have long
debated identity essentialism and have brought that discussion to
the world of genetics.254 Since the earliest days of the new genetic
research, biologists have struggled with the concepts of genetic
determinism and essentialism. Richard Lewontin and others have
written at length and compellingly about the dangers of drawing
too much meaning from one’s genes to the exclusion of other
fundamental factors at play in genetic expression like environment
and the host organism.255 GATTACA, a recent movie, captures one
dystopic version of a society overly obsessed with deterministic
essentialism of genetic identity.256
To say that DNA contains information that tells one, and
others, a lot about oneself is not to say that it tells one all one
needs to know about oneself or necessarily the most important
252 See id. at 154 (associating genetic essentialism and biological determinism with the
problem of geneticization of identity).
253 See Hugh Miller, III, DNA Blueprints, Personhood, and Genetic Privacy, 8 HEALTH
MATRIX 179, 219 (1998) (“DNA structure should not be conflated with the ‘essential encoder’
of an immutable personal identity or character.”).
254 See, e.g., Paul Brodwin, Genetics, Identity, and the Anthropology of Essentialism, 75
ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 323 passim (2002) (discussing some of the issues that arise when
genetic information is used to help determine cultural identity).
255 See generally R.C. LEWONTIN ET AL., NOT IN OUR GENES: BIOLOGY, IDEOLOGY, AND
HUMAN NATURE (1984) (discussing the political and social ideologies that underlie biological
determinism and arguing that determinists miss a number of important factors in human
behavior beyond simple genetics, such as environment); RICHARD LEWONTIN, THE TRIPLE
HELIX: GENE, ORGANISM AND ENVIRONMENT (Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (discussing the
danger of viewing an organism as merely “computed” from its DNA rather than taking into
account environment and other factors).
256 GATTACA (Columbia Pictures 1997).
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essence of one’s identity. Genetic information contributes to the
portrait of identity and need not be diminished or exaggerated in
its importance to do so.
Yet the kaleidoscopic nature of the identity captured by the
physical and informational aspects of DNA is very robust. The
hallmarks of its physical and informational natures—
inaccessibility, uniqueness, permanence, and existence at the
body’s core, and its powerful, intimate, personal, predictive, and
shared nature—exist not only in the present but over the
dimensions of time and space. One’s DNA is present at one’s
beginning. Some of it is present before one’s beginning—in one’s
ancestors—and some of it is present after one’s end—in one’s
descendants.
The spatial and temporal dynamism of DNA’s physical and
informational presence also accentuate the kaleidoscopic nature of
the identifying features it possesses. For example, one piece of
DNA does not exist in isolation from another. Often, one region of
DNA interacts with another region to produce “an effect.” For
example, some cancers involve the mutation of genes which,
unmutated, would suppress the unregulated growth of certain
cells—cells which themselves are produced by other genes.257
More broadly, as with the sequencing of human genomes has
intensified, scientists have become increasingly aware of the
profound dynamism within the human genome, even in regions of
DNA thought to be dormant or unused. The ENCODE Project
Consortium has begun looking at non-gene regions of DNA and
has concluded that “through the analysis of 1% of the human
genome that the humble, unpretentious nongene sequences have
essential regulatory roles.”258
257 See SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE EMPEROR OF ALL MALADIES: A BIOGRAPHY OF
CANCER 368–69 (2010) (discussing how the lack of “negative” genes leads to the formation of
cancer cells).
258 John M. Greally, Encyclopedia of Humble DNA, 447 NATURE 782, 782 (2007)
(discussing The Encode Project Consortium, Identification and Analysis of Functional
Elements in 1% of the Human Genome by the ENCODE Pilot Project, 447 NATURE 799
(2007)). The regions the consortium studied had previously been known as regions
containing “junk” DNA— DNA of no known use. See Gina Kolata, Bits of Mystery DNA, Far
From ‘Junk,’ Play Crucial Role, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.
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Multi-factorial genetic disorders—disorders that have genetic,
behavioral, and environmental roots—are much more common
than Mendelian genetic disorders. The interplay between genes,
environment, and behavior is the hallmark of multi-factorial
disorders, such as some types of cancer, asthma,259 and diabetes.260
Interactions between one’s genes, the physical environment within
or outside one’s body, or with the consequences of one’s behavior
may cause genes to be turned off or on or to take a different path of
expression.
The recent understanding that many complex disorders have,
among other things, genetic roots stands at the beginning of a
much more profound scientific understanding of such disorders as
asthma, atherosclerosis, diabetes, hypertension, and obesity.261 It
already tells us how profoundly DNA is intertwined in a layered,
dynamic process refracting through time and space to create
portions of who we are, physically and informationally. It is a
multi-faceted, multi-generational kaleidoscope of identity.
This image of a kaleidoscope of identity refracting through time
and space is a complex metaphor with little parallel. Michael
Ondaatje, in his novel Divisadero, describes a belfry that has been

com/2012/09/06/science/far-from-junk-dna-dark-matter-proves-crucial-to-health.html?page
wanted=all (noting that DNA studied by ENCODE Project was previously considered “junk”
DNA). As Greally entertainingly explains:
The results of the pilot phase of this project, which involved an analysis of
1% (30 megabases) of the human genome, are not good news for genes,
which will no longer be able to hog the limelight. Even this preliminary
study reveals that the genome is much more than a mere vehicle for genes,
and sheds light on the extensive molecular decision-making that takes
place before a gene is expressed.
Greally, supra, at 783.
259 See generally F.D. Martinez, Genes, Environments, Development and Asthma: A
Reappraisal, 29 EUR. RESPIRATORY J. 179 (2007) (studying interactions between genetic
determinants for asthma and their genetic, environmental, and developmental contexts).
260 See generally Ulf Risérus et al., Dietary Fats and Prevention of Type 2 Diabetes, 48
PROGRESS IN LIPID RES. 44 (2009) (studying the effect of dietary fat on the risk of type 2
diabetes).
261 See Ron Korstanje & Beverly Paigen, From QTL to Gene: The Harvest Begins, 31
NATURE GENETICS 235 passim (2002) (discussing the technique of mapping QTL genes,
which identifies chromosomal regions affecting various illnesses, and asserting that “the
harvest of QTL genes is just beginning”).
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constructed like a coil or screw and analogizes it to a helix.262 It
provokes his character to consider the helical effect of his memory.
He relates it to the effect of a villanelle, a particular poetic form in
which tercets recur and repeat themselves:
It’s like a villanelle, this inclination of going back to
events in our past, the way the villanelle’s form
refuses to move forward in linear development, circling
instead at those familiar moments of emotion. Only
the rereading counts, Nabokov said. So the strange
form of that belfry, turning onto itself again and again,
felt familiar to me. For we live with those retrievals
from childhood that coalesce and echo throughout our
lives, the way shattered pieces of glass in a
kaleidoscope reappear in new forms and are songlike
in their refrains and rhymes, making up a single
monologue. We live permanently in the recurrence of
our own stories, whatever story we tell.263
To paraphrase Ondaatje, the complex image of the kaleidoscope
of identity that is DNA coalesces and echoes throughout our lives,
reappearing in new forms over time and space, yet making up a
single identity. We live permanently in the recurrence of our
DNA, whatever identity we show.
As noted above, genetic information is powerful, personal,
intimate, shared, and predictive. These features make it different
than other information. But one need not label that information
exceptional in its features in order to appreciate those features for
the purpose of understanding genetic privacy.264 The matrix of
these features, while possibly unique as compared to other
collections of information, will be treated as private for Fourth
Amendment purposes depending on people’s expectations about

MICHAEL ONDAATJE, DIVISADERO 135 (2007).
Id. at 136.
264 Kaye, supra note 38, at 65; see also Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic
Privacy and the Law: An End to Genetics Exceptionalism, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (1999)
(“Genetic information is not truly unique compared to other health information.”).
262
263
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genetic privacy rather than on whether these features are
exceptional or not.
3.
Dignitary Privacy.
Dignitary privacy contemplates a
portrait of privacy less driven by physical and informational
images. All conceptions of privacy in some respect contemplate an
intrusion upon a protected core. For some of these conceptions,
the protected core is, primarily, something relatively concrete—a
body, a place, an object, even information.265 In Solove’s capturing
of the traditional expressions of the idea of privacy, these
conceptions of privacy would include: limited access to the self,
secrecy, and the control of personal information.266
For other conceptions, the protected core is primarily something
much less concrete and much more intangible—one’s identity,
one’s sense of self, or one’s dignity. In the language of Solove’s
traditional expressions: the right to be let alone, to personhood,
and to intimacy.267 These features of the protected core do not
exist independent of the more concrete ones. But they capture an
aspect of that core that, at once, builds on and is different from its
more concrete siblings.
For example, when a home is burglarized, the homeowner has
suffered an intrusion on several very tangible aspects of a
protected core—the home, items that were taken, and perhaps
information to which the burglar had access. The homeowner also
has suffered an intrusion on a more intangible aspect of that
core—the sense that an unwanted person has been within a zone
that is personal and intimate. The second intrusion to some extent
builds on the first because no intrusion on the intangible core
would occur without the more concrete intrusion on home,
property, and information.
But more has occurred than just the concrete intrusion. We
sometimes hear friends or family who, referring to a burglary of
their residence, say: “It’s not what they took, it’s the sense that
someone was in my house” or “it’s creepy to think someone was
here.” It may go too far to suggest in this context that the
265
266
267

SOLOVE, supra note 152, at 12–13.
Id.
Id.
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intangible violation goes to the core of who one is or one’s dignity.
It seems almost completely dependent on the physical intrusion.
Part of that reluctance is because the physical intrusion itself
looms so vivid and large in comparison to what I call the dignitary
intrusion.
Surreptitious harvesting of out-of-body DNA aligns this
calculus of privacy values differently. Currently, courts and
commentators view the physical intrusion as nonexistent and the
informational intrusion as limited at least in its use. Whether
those judges measure that particular calculus appropriately, the
significance of dignitary privacy is brought into higher relief in
surreptitious harvesting cases.
Though the victim of
governmental surreptitious harvesting feels no physical pain, the
presence of the government “in her DNA” and the knowledge of
that presence are intrusions on one’s dignity and self-identity.
Recall the genetic-database cases in which judges spoke of
“[t]he more telescopic and inchoate value of personal privacy”; of
DNA being “immensely private”; of “privacy and dignity”; and of
“the secret regions of man’s life.”268 To have the government
present in one’s DNA and to have the government store one’s DNA
without any limits on its use speaks of a limit on individual
autonomy. That presence and that storage, secret as it may be,
might affect one’s conduct and self-identity. And this effect might
occur even though the government may never actively do anything
with the DNA. The dignity inherent in individual autonomy free
of governmental interference flows from one’s inherent dignity as a
human being—what many call a “negative liberty.”269
The idea of dignity as a constitutional consideration is common.
Noemi Rao has written that the concept of inherent dignity is
present in much of the Supreme Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence. For example, as the Court has addressed issues of
drug testing, self-representation, sexual autonomy, reproductive
rights, and free speech, it has discerned the concept of inherent
See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text.
Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
183, 203–05 (2011). Much of what follows draws on Rao’s analysis of the three kinds of
dignity that constitutions protect.
268
269
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dignity in the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.270
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, the plurality said:
These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.271
The Miranda Court was also emphatic about the role of dignity
in its analysis of the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination when it spoke of “one overriding thought: the
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a
government—state or federal—must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizens.”272
More specifically, the idea of dignitary privacy is central to the
Fourth Amendment. It is the most explicit privacy amendment to
the Constitution and, over the years, the Court has consistently
identified dignity as one of the interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment from a case like Schmerber (the Fourth Amendment
protects personal privacy and dignity)273 to a case like City of
Ontario, California v. Quon (the Fourth Amendment guarantees
privacy, dignity, and security).274
The idea of dignitary privacy also appears in circumstances
involving newer technology. Conceptually, the GPS-tracking and
the public-video surveillance examples seem to represent practical

270
271
272
273
274

Id. at 207–16.
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (emphasis added).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (emphasis added).
384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
130 S. Ct. 2619, 2627 (2010).
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circumstances that raise dignitary, as well as other, privacy
concerns. In the GPS cases, most commonly, the police place a
GPS device on the outside of a suspect’s car while it is in a public
place in order to track the travels of the car’s driver.275 The police
do not engage in any physical intrusion, either into the suspect’s
car or onto his property in order to access the car.
In the public-video surveillance circumstance, the police
position cameras in advantageous locations to film all the activity
and people there.276 Again, in capturing people’s faces and conduct
as they go about their daily business, the police intrude neither on
their body nor on any physical zone of privacy.
In both circumstances, the privacy intrusion is one that
essentially occurs in public. It is to a protected core that relates to
one’s presence in the public world. One can conceive of this core in
a number of ways beyond simply the gathering of personal or
intimate information: Does one have the right to be left alone, even
in public?277 Does one have a right to anonymity even when in
public?278 Does one have the right not to be always watched by the
government?
This less tangible, more dignitary sense of privacy is, at best, a
nascent one in the GPS cases. In State v. Jackson, a 2003 GPS
case, the Washington Supreme Court recognized a very
substantial informational-privacy interest against 24-hour GPS

275 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (tracking suspect’s whereabouts via
GPS constitutes search for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Moran, 349 F.
Supp. 2d 425, 467 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (attaching a GPS device to defendant’s vehicle did not
constitute search or seizure); Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523, 526 (Nev. 2002) (suspect “had
neither a subjective nor an objective expectation of privacy in the bumper of his vehicle”);
State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003) (“[C]itizens of this State have a right to be
free from the type of governmental intrusion that occurs when a GPS device is attached to a
citizen’s vehicle, regardless of reduced privacy expectations due to advances in
technology.”).
276 See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and
the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 219–22 (2002) (describing the use of surveillance
cameras in the United States); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 82–83 (2007) (same).
277 See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890) (describing the right to be left alone).
278 SLOBOGIN, supra note 276, at 79–117.
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surveillance.279
In doing so, it also noted with approval the
analysis of the Oregon Supreme Court in a radio-transmitter case.
In the case, the court evaluated a kind of privacy interest on top of
the already significant informational one it had found:
The court reasoned that use of a device that enabled
the police to locate a person within a 40-mile radius
day or night “is a significant limitation on freedom
from scrutiny” and “a staggering limitation upon
personal freedom.” The court noted that allowing use
of such radio transmitters would mean that
“individuals must more readily assume that they are
the objects of government scrutiny” noting that
commentators “have observed that freedom may be
impaired as much, if not more so, by the threat of
scrutiny as by the fact of scrutiny.”280
Yet in United States v. Jones, a case involving surreptitious GPS
surveillance, the Supreme Court did not explicitly describe the
And the public-video-surveillance
privacy interest at stake.281
cases have not yet made their way into the case law in this
country.282
Whatever the current level of recognition of a dignitary-privacy
invasion in the GPS-tracking cases, the above examples show that
the focal point of a dignitary-privacy claim is the presence of an
“other” as the scrutinizer. Whether the scrutiny accompanies a
bodily invasion, (Schmerber), a cell phone (Quon), one’s
decisionmaking (Casey), or one’s psyche (Miranda), it is the fact

76 P.3d at 224.
Id. at 224 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1048 (Or.
1988)).
281 The plurality focused narrowly on a property analysis, one that a group of four justices
felt resolved the issue. See 132 S. Ct. at 949–53. Justices Sotomayor’s and Alito’s opinions
at least explored the informational-privacy dimension of the practice. See id. at 957
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing for right of privacy information); id. at 964 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that the public has an expectation of privacy in GPS tracking data).
282 Public-video-surveillance usage is much more developed in England. See SLOBOGIN,
supra note 276, at 83–84 (discussing the extent of surveillance in the United Kingdom).
279
280
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that someone else is there, that one is not alone, or that the other
is uninvited that is the essence of the violation.
The sense of violation that accompanies the dignitary intrusion
does not grow merely out of the other’s physical presence or the
other’s active interference with one’s body or one’s personal
information. To paraphrase and extend the logic of one court,
freedom may be impaired as much, if not more so, by the thought
that someone has been there, is there, or may be there, whether
they did, said, or took anything.283 Or, as Justice Sotomayor noted
in her Jones concurrence, “[a]wareness that the Government may
be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.”284 To be
scrutinized in and of itself offends one’s dignity whatever the use
to which the scrutiny is put.
The nature of a Fourth Amendment dignitary-privacy invasion
requires that a governmental authority engage in the scrutiny.
The idea that the government in some capacity is present in one’s
decisionmaking, one’s cell-phone conversations, one’s psyche, or
one’s daily whereabouts accentuates the harm to one’s dignity.285
Anthony Amsterdam directly addressed the fundamental issue
in his 1974 piece on Katz and the Fourth Amendment:
The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment. It
is whether, if the particular form of surveillance
practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated
by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and
freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to
a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and
open society. That, in outright terms, is the judgment
lurking underneath the Supreme Court’s decision in
Katz, and it seems to me the judgment that the fourth
amendment inexorably requires the Court to make.286

Campbell, 759 P.2d at 1048.
132 S. Ct. at 956.
285 Decisionmaking and psyche invasions like those in Casey and Miranda occur under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Nonetheless, the specter of the governmental presence
is the same.
286 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
283
284
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What offends one’s dignity is that scrutiny of DNA offers up the
kaleidoscope of identity to those with access. The dignitary
intrusion is not what the government will or may do with such
access. It is that the government gets to look into the kaleidoscope
in all its layered, temporal, and spatial richness. The mere
presence of the government at that window on core identity is the
dignitary intrusion287 and it compounds the physical and
informational intrusion.
By contrast, the dignitary intrusion associated with
fingerprinting is less significant. Fingerprints too represent a
color in the identity spectrum. Like DNA, fingerprints are in code
and are available in public. Unlike DNA, they are less biologically
locked, and the quality of their identifying information is relatively
one-dimensional in contrast to DNA’s kaleidoscope of identity.
Superficial by nature, fingerprints do not give rise to a sense that
they provide a window on core identity. Thus, while a mild
dignitary invasion may exist when the government possesses
fingerprints, it is different in kind from that associated with
DNA.288
***
Any assessment of the expectation of privacy that people have
in DNA will be an approximation that inevitably includes a
measure of subjective judgment. This is because the concept of
harming one’s dignity implies a level of definitional certainty and
objectivity that is anything but the case. Dignity is, by its nature,
a very subjective concept—one person’s dignity may be another’s
prickliness. Historically, it has been very much a moving target,
particularly as a legal concept.289 Including an assessment of the
403 (1974).
287 This dignitary intrusion is exacerbated because some police departments have begun
compiling DNA databases of samples collected in circumstances outside those covered by
the regulatory structures of state and federal law. For example, the New York City medical
examiner’s office purportedly has a “linkage” or “rogue” database that includes former
suspects, arrestees, and others never convicted of a crime. See Richard Willing, Authorities
Find More Uses for DNA Databases, USA TODAY, Mar. 26, 2007, http://usatoday30.usatod
ay.com/news/nation/2007-03-25-dna-databases-inside_n.htm (discussing content and use of
rogue databases).
288 See infra Part VI.
289 Neomi Rao captures this slipperiness well:
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extent of dignitary harm in measuring one’s expectation of privacy
risks reducing the assessment to merely one individual’s
judgment.
The Katz test accounts for this concern. It requires a subjective
expectation of privacy and an expectation of privacy that society is
willing to recognize as reasonable.290 The objective focus of the
second prong moderates the risk of the test offering Fourth
Amendment protection to over personalized, idiosyncratic senses of
privacy. The challenge then is to lend at least some empirical
meaning to the genetic privacy that “society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable,”291 to do so in a way that transcends the
idiosyncratic, the personal and the anecdotal, and to avoid mere
theorizing.
VI. “SOCIETY IS WILLING TO RECOGNIZE AS REASONABLE . . .”—A
SOCIETAL PERSPECTIVE ON GENETIC PRIVACY
Post-Katz, the Supreme Court has periodically referred to a
desire to look for the legitimation of the expectations of privacy to
be protected outside the Fourth Amendment itself. In Rakas v.
Illinois, the Court expressed an interest in external legal concepts,
like property law and in “understandings that are recognized and
permitted by society”292 as such sources, and that idea has
continued to appear in the Court’s jurisprudence.293
As a fundamental precept of human rights and basic liberties, dignity
really took hold after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stated:
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” But even
in the Universal Declaration, the start of international efforts to protect
human dignity, the drafters disagreed about the meaning of human dignity.
Today, widespread adoption of dignity in modern constitutions and
human rights documents has not led to any greater consensus—rather
different conceptions of dignity remain. The fact that “dignity” is an
important yet slippery concept has become commonplace.
Rao, supra note 269, at 185–86 (footnotes omitted).
290 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
291 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
292 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978); see also Christopher Slobogin & Joseph
E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment
Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42
DUKE L.J. 727, 731 (1993) (“Although this language appeared in a footnote, and was
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Christopher Slobogin and Joseph Schumacher have made the
most direct effort to capture empirically the public’s understanding
of a variety of Fourth Amendment privacy interests. In a 1993
study, Slobogin and Schumacher surveyed over 200 people “to
ascertain their understanding of the interests implicated by
various types of police investigative techniques.”294
From the survey, they developed the preliminary hypothesis
that court decisions about where expectations of privacy lie do not
necessarily reflect societal understandings and, in fact, “tend to
underestimate the privacy and autonomy interests infringed on by
police actions.”295 Unfortunately, Slobogin and Schumacher
conducted their survey at a time when the police were not using
either genetic databases or surreptitious DNA harvesting. Others
have not extended this empirical approach to those kinds of police
investigative efforts.
Some polling however exists on the general idea of genetic
privacy, particularly as to genetic information and genetic
discrimination.296 One such study surveyed 1,199 individuals
about their level of trust in doctors, spouses, researchers, law
enforcement, health insurers, and employers with access to test
results for genetic disorders.297 At the extremes, 86% had some or
a lot of trust in their doctors, and only 16% had some or a lot of
trust in their employers.298 Law enforcement fell in the low middle
with 46% expressing some or a lot of trust and 54% expressing
only a little or no trust.299

directed solely toward defining the standing concept, it has since been relied upon in the
text of several other cases involving the ‘search’ issue, often rephrased in terms of
expectations of privacy ‘society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’ ”).
293 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 292, at 731–32.
294 Id. at 732.
295 Id.
296 See, e.g., Kira A. Apse et al., Perceptions of Genetic Discrimination Among At-Risk
Relatives of Colorectal Cancer Patients, 6 GENETICS IN MED. 510, 511 (2004) (studying
people’s fears over genetic discrimination).
297 GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., U.S. PUBLIC OPINION ON USES OF GENETIC
INFORMATION AND GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 1–2 (2007), available at http://www.dnapolicy.
org/policy.polls.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
298 Id. at 2.
299 Id.
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Absent direct survey results on surreptitious DNA harvesting
or on the privacy concerns stemming from police possession of
genetic information, a look at the use of DNA images in public
culture helps to reveal fundamental attitudes about DNA.
Genetics and DNA have been a focus of public culture for a long
time. Karen Rothenberg has written about the space that genetics
has occupied in the public imagination as revealed by drama
during the eugenic era of the early twentieth century and during
the “new genetics” era since 1990.300 The 1997 science-fiction film,
Gattaca, portrays an acutely dystopic vision of a future society in
which the predictive value of genetic information organizes society
into the gene elite and the “de-gene-erates.”301
Privacy is
nonexistent in a society in which one’s DNA determined all.302
Beyond film and literature, a look at public discourse, especially
the use of DNA metaphors, through the prism of language theory
suggests that public attitudes towards DNA and its relationship
with core identity is deeply embedded in our culture. Language
theorists tell us that in using a metaphor to describe something,
we are trying to bring a better understanding of that “something”
to the audience by referencing a reference point that we already
know and understand.303 By doing so, we lend conception of the
reference point to our conception of the less known thing, thereby
bringing in more definition.304
300 See generally Karen H. Rothenberg, From Eugenics to the “New” Genetics: “The Play’s
the Thing,” 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 407 (2010) (concluding that the ethical, legal, and social
implications of genetics have captured and will continue to capture the imagination of both
science and theatre).
301 GATTACA (Columbia Pictures 1997); see also David A. Kirby, The Devil in Our DNA: A
Brief History of Eugenics in Science Fiction Films, 26 LITERATURE & MED. J. 83, 103–06
(2007) (“GATTACA depicts many of the ethical issues associated with the new eugenics,
such as genetic discrimination, genetic prophecy, and the homogenization of society.”).
302 Cf. Kirby, supra note 301, at 104 (explaining the film’s depiction of human beings’
value relative to the value of their cast-off DNA).
303 What follows is based on the important work of language theorists like George Lakoff
and Mark Johnson and captured in their classic book, GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON,
METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).
304 Lina Hellsten has described the process as applied to the metaphor “horsepower” as
follows:
[A] metaphor consists of two or more separate issues, the source domain
(e.g., horses) and the target domain (e.g., car engines), and a set of elements
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For instance, Lakoff and Johnson offer two examples of
ontological metaphors for the mind. Statements like:
“We’re still trying to grind out the solution to this
equation”
“My mind isn’t operating today”
“Boy, the wheels are turning now!”
“I’m a little rusty today”305
contain metaphors that capture the idea of the “Mind as a
Machine” and bring another layer of understanding to the way the
mind works.306
Statements like:
“Her ego is very fragile”
“You have to handle him with care since his wife’s
death”
“He broke under cross-examination”
“She is easily crushed”307
contain metaphors that capture the idea of “The Mind is a Brittle
Object.”308 Both metaphorical images present conceptual models
for understanding a less-than-fully-understood thing—the mind.
Both lend a different layer of understanding to the mind. As
Lakoff and Johnson describe:
The MACHINE metaphor gives us a conception of the
mind as having an on-off state, a level of efficiency, a
productive capacity, an internal mechanism, a source
that are mapped across the source and the target domains (e.g., function as
a source of power for a vehicle). The purpose of metaphorical mapping, at a
general level, is to approach new issues in terms of something that is
already familiar to the user(s) of that metaphor.
Lina Hellsten, Popular Metaphors of Biosciences: Bridges over Time?, 16 CONFIGURATIONS
11, 14 (2009) (footnote omitted).
305 Id. at 27.
306 Id at 27–28.
307 Id. at 28.
308 Id.
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of energy, and an operating condition. The BRITTLE
OBJECT metaphor is not nearly as rich. It allows us to
talk only about psychological strength. However, there
is a range of mental experience that can be conceived
of in terms of either metaphor.309
Note that the accuracy of the metaphor is not the issue—the
question is not whether the mind actually works as a machine or is
a brittle object at the neuro-psychological level. Rather, the
metaphors we choose to explain the mind tell us about how we
order our world—the metaphors we live by.
Additionally, the use of metaphors helps us bring some
boundaries to things that otherwise seem boundary-less. The
expression “Harry is in love” conceptualizes love as a kind of
location or container, bringing more definition to the concept of
love.310 It grounds the less clearly delineated in the more clearly
delineated.311
Several scholars have examined the different metaphors and
imagery used to describe genetics and DNA as a means of
explaining and understanding society’s attitudes. Celeste Condit
has explored the metaphors and rhetoric about “the gene” in the
public discourse over the course of the twentieth century. In
particular, she tracked the changes in metaphors used to “explain”
human heredity from the eugenics era to the end of the twentieth
century.312 José Van Dijck has explored the role of images in the
popular representations of the new genetics since the 1950s.313
She evaluated how different and conflicting popular
representations of genetics over time reflected the interplay
Id.
Id. at 58–59.
311 Id. at 59.
312 See generally CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, THE MEANINGS OF THE GENE: PUBLIC
DEBATES ABOUT HUMAN HEREDITY (David J. De Pew et al. eds., 1999) (describing a
sequence of metaphors over time used to describe human heredity: a breeding-stock
metaphor; the idea of the gene controling of humans; the code metaphor; and the blueprint
metaphor).
313 JOSÉ VAN DIJCK, IMAGENATION: POPULAR IMAGES OF GENETICS (1998) (describing how
different groups have described genetics in metaphors and how those metaphors changed
over time).
309
310
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between these images and the meaning lent by society to
developments in genetics.
Both Condit and Van Dijck focused on what images or
metaphors people used to explain DNA or the gene. They were
able to gain a new understanding about how society thought about
the unfamiliar—genetics—by virtue of the familiar images they
used to explain it—breeding, stock, code, blueprint etc. In the
language of Hellsten, the source domain—the blueprint—helps
explain the target domain—DNA—by bringing the elements of a
blueprint to one’s efforts to understand DNA.
Dorothy Nelkin and M. Susan Lindee began to flip this dynamic
around. In The DNA Mystique: The Gene as a Cultural Icon, they
explored how popular culture used images of the gene and DNA to
see what those images told us about societal attitudes towards the
gene.314 They found that the gene was treated as “a cultural icon,
a symbol, almost a magical force” in popular culture.315 In
particular, they concluded that “the images and narratives of the
gene in popular culture reflect and convey a message we will call
genetic essentialism.”316 That message reduces humans with all
their “social, historical, and moral complexity” to a molecular
entity, the gene.317
If one flips the dynamic used by Condit and Van Dijck around
completely, one would look at how popular culture uses the DNA
metaphor to understand the culture’s attitude toward DNA.
Instead of treating DNA as the thing in need of more
understanding or grounding, one would use DNA as the source
domain or reference point and any variety of less familiar or less
grounded things as target domains. The use of DNA as a
referential metaphor would then reflect how society thought of
DNA itself.
314 DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A CULTURAL
ICON (2004).
315 Id. at 2.
316 Id.
317 Id. Nelkin and Lindee looked at a wide expanse of images, for example, the visual, the
artistic, and the oral, and not just those that were metaphors. As such, their classic study
is only so useful in discerning societal attitudes towards the kaleidoscope of identity
described above.
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I examined how the term “DNA” was used over a one-year
period in the New York Times and USA Today.318 This study
begins to inform us about societal attitudes toward DNA. In both
newspapers, the significant majority of its uses were as a scientific
term referencing genetic research or forensics rather than as a
metaphor. The New York Times had 267 mentions of DNA over
the course of the year and 73.8% of them were scientific references,
not metaphorical ones. In USA Today, 63.9% of the 180 references
were scientific. Nonetheless, just about one-quarter of the Times
references and over one-third of the USA Today references were
metaphorical. 319
The articles in which DNA was used metaphorically were
primarily of three sorts: sports, business, and the arts. In USA
Today, the metaphorical use of DNA occurred most frequently in
sports articles, followed closely by business articles, and then, to a
lesser extent, in articles on the arts, including television.320 In the
New York Times, the use of DNA occurred most frequently in
business articles, then arts articles, and to a lesser extent in sports
articles.321
Whatever the subject of the articles, the thing sought to be
better understood or grounded—the target domain—was almost
always behavior of some kind.322 In articles about business, it was

318 I recorded every mention of DNA over a one-year period in both newspapers.
The
papers were selected because both have a national circulation and arguably different,
though probably overlapping, readerships. Though the term was used by journalists, the
premise underlying this study is that journalists would use the kinds of metaphors that
would be within their audience’s comprehension to explain something that is less
understood or grounded. In other words, journalists would likely not use a quantumphysics metaphor to explain anything other than impenetrable complexity.
319 Out of 267 references in the New York Times, 197 were scientific and 70 were
metaphorical. In USA Today, 115 references were scientific and 65 were metaphorical.
320 Of the 65 references in USA Today, DNA was used metaphorically 22 times in sports
articles, 18 times in business/marketing articles, and 10 times in arts articles. There was
lesser use in political articles (5), book reviews (3), and personal articles (2).
321 Of the 70 metaphorical uses of DNA in the New York Times, 20 occurred in
business/marketing articles, 19 occurred in arts articles, and 9 uses occurred in sports
articles.
322 Over 90% of the metaphorical uses of DNA in USA Today and the New York Times
involved behavior of some sort as the target domain.
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the behavior of a company;323 in articles about music or the arts, it
was the behavior of a band,324 an artist,325 or an author; and in
articles about sports, it was an individual’s326 or a team’s327
behavior. More specifically, the use of a DNA metaphor virtually
always sought to explain an aspect of identity. Sometimes, the
reference was direct—he acted this way because it is who he is:
“He is the epitome of what the Heat is about,” team
president Pat Riley said. “He is our anchor, he is a
true warrior and a great professional.”
That’s why Wade reached out to Haslem constantly
during the free-agent process, if only to remind him
that was the case.
“I would be changing my DNA if I left just for
money,” Haslem said.328
Or:
Pie-making is in the DNA of Melissa . . . and Emily
Elsen.
Their grandmother baked pies for their

323 E.g., Nick Bunkley, Dutch Car Maker Still Pushing to Buy Saab, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/business/global/13saab.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y
(questioning Saab’s DNA).
324 E.g., Jon Caramanica, Dapper, Privileged and Unapologetic, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/arts/music/16vampire.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y (traces
of ska in Vampire Weekend’s DNA).
325 E.g., Stephen Holden, Three Loners on a Road Leading to One Another, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/26/movies/26yellow.html?emc=tnt&tntemail
0=y (character not in actor’s DNA).
326 E.g., Peyton Manning Not Looking for Drastic Solutions to End Slump, USA TODAY,
Dec. 8, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/colts/2010-12-08-peyton-slump_N.
htm (Peyton’s preparation in his DNA).
327 E.g., Mike Dodd, Why Can’t Cubs Win? Quirks at Wrigley Field Among Theories, USA
TODAY, Aug. 20, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/nl/cubs/2010-08-17-basebal
l-chicago-cubs-lou-piniella-wrigley-field-_N.htm (Cubs’ championship-prohibiting DNA).
328 Haslem Staying with Miami; Mike Miller Expected To Join as Well, USA TODAY, July
13, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/heat/2010-07-12-udonis-haslem-co
ntract_N.htm.
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mother’s restaurant in Hecla, S.D., and it was from her
that they learned their craft.329
Sometimes, the DNA metaphor explains why a particular group
acted the way it did:
Because the festival, which runs through May 2, was
born in the ashes of the World Trade Center as a
community development project to revive the
devastated economy of Lower Manhattan, you might
say “My Trip to Al-Qaeda” is woven into [the Tribeca
Film Festival’s] DNA.330
Other times, the reference was to accumulated behavior and
offered to identify who someone or some group is:
“Value is an intrinsic part of the DNA of
Nymphenburg [the porcelain manufactory of the
Bavarian crown],” he said. “We are a raw diamond, an
independent company with a social responsibility to
the place and the people.”331
Or:
At first, Disney had high hopes for the characters,
exploring additional licensing and even a feature film.
But focus group research soured Disney on them.
Mothers, the research showed, disliked the violence—
particularly the hand-to-hand combat—that is part of
the franchise’s DNA.332

329 Florence Fabricant, Sisters Open a Pie Shop in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/dining/21pies.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y.
330 Stephen Holden, 12 Days, 132 Films, 38 Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/movies/16tribeca.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y.
331 Suzy Menkes, Nymphenburg Porcelain Gets a Fresh New Look, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/fashion/27iht-fnymph.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y.
332 Brian Stelter & Brooks Barnes, Disney Sells a Franchise That Mothers Didn’t Like,
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/business/media/13saban.htm
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And, occasionally, the DNA metaphor was a broad-stroke
statement of identity:
That might have been the end of the story, except
that this is South Africa, the country that ended a
vicious system of racial segregation 16 years ago to
create a noisy, fractious, vibrant democracy. Poking a
finger in the eye of authority is part of the national
DNA.333
As is apparent from the above, often DNA is being used
metaphorically to capture a core aspect of identity, not simply a
transitory or passing feature. Lakoff and Johnson call such
aspects of metaphorical use “entailments,” which bring even more
depth to the metaphorical reference.334
The entailments that come with the use of the DNA metaphor
to capture aspects of identity involve:
Permanence:
“That’s who I am,” he said. “I can’t be afraid to
express myself. I have to be me.”
Manuel almost seems to draw a spiritual lift from
his deep, staccato laugh, which usually follows one of
his humorous remarks. The jokes, witticisms and wry
comments are part of his DNA, and they are not going
away because of games that are lost.335

l?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y.
333 Celia W. Dugger, South Africa Pushes To Make the Cup Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/24/sports/soccer/24safrica.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y.
334 LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 303, at 139. Lakoff and Johnson use the example of
the metaphor, LOVE IS A COLLABORATIVE WORK OF ART to illustrate common
entailments like, “Love is work. Love is active. Love requires cooperation. Love requires
dedication . . . Love involves shared responsibility . . . Love demands sacrifice . . .” etc. Id.
at 140.
335 David Waldstein, Manuel Under Pressure, but Hardly Showing It, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/24/sports/baseball/24mets.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y.
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Immutability:
The years clicked by. Boys became men. All but one
went off to fight World War II. One didn’t come back.
Careers replaced carousing.
Still, they remained
friends, a lifelong affection for one another somehow
inscribed in their DNA. Every so often, they
demonstrated their unflinching fidelity by gathering
for a reunion dinner.336
Inevitability or fatalism:
Morris agrees.
“[A] huge problem is that the
irresponsibility of those large company CEOs has
painted a negative portrayal of ALL business . . .”
“[W]e WILL end up paying for the free lunch we've
been enjoying. Capitalism/entrepreneurship is in the
human DNA. Drift is temporary,” tweeted Larry
Strassner, CEO of Russell & Mackenna, which makes
cottage-style furniture.337
Intimacy or at one’s core:
Nor is there anything new about complaints that BP
is secretive in its operations and given to doubletalk in
responding to valid criticisms in host countries. This
is certainly not the whole story, but these very British
negatives are deeply embedded in its corporate
DNA.338
Or, most ironically:
336 N.R. Kleinfeld, Together More Than 70 Years, Friends Reunite, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/nyregion/09friends.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y.
337 Del Jones, CEOs Tweet in News Story Reported Completely on Twitter, USA TODAY,
May 28, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/2009-05-27-ceos-tw
itter-reporting-capitalism_N.htm.
338 Karl E. Meyer & Shareen Blair Brysac, How British (Really) is BP?, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/opinion/17iht-edmeyer.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y.
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Q: How much of my privacy am I giving up?
A: You’re giving up none of your privacy. Our
business is about consumer first, advertiser second,
and AdKeeper third.
Services like Facebook and Google have done a
disservice to the industry because they don’t think that
privacy is in their DNA. At Facebook their DNA is to
share. We will never give your personal data to an
advertiser. Advertisers would like to have that. But
we’re not giving it to them.339
The depth and breadth of the core-identity imagery associated
with the DNA metaphor in these examples of public discourse is
unmistakable. The ubiquity goes beyond the New York Times and
USA Today. In a debate on the U.S. Senate floor on the quality of
President Obama’s judicial nominees, Senator Jeff Sessions said,
“I’m sure that less than one percent of the lawyers in America are
members of the ACLU. . . . It seems if you have the ACLU DNA,
you get a pretty good leg up to being nominated by this
president.”340
In his biography of the late Steve Jobs, Walter Isaacson quoted
a one-time Jobs girlfriend commenting about Jobs and Daniel
Kottke, “Daniel didn’t have that DNA of ruthlessness, so he was a
bit flipped by Steve’s behavior.”341 Later, Isaacson quotes Jobs as
saying, “It’s in Apple’s DNA that technology alone is not enough.
We believe that it’s technology married with the humanities that
yields us the result that makes our heart sing.”342
In the language of Lakoff and Johnson, these entailments—
permanence, immutability, inevitability, intimacy—reverberate

339 David Lieberman, Advertisers Betting That AdKepper’s a Web Business Keeper, USA
TODAY, Nov. 3, 2010, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/technologylive/post/2010/11/
advertisers-betting-that-adkeepers-a-web-business-keeper/1.
340 Ryan J. Reilly, Jeff Sessions Rants Against Judicial Nominees with ‘ACLA DNA’
(VIDEO), TPM.COM, Dec. 21, 2010, http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/12/
jeff_sessions_rants_against_judicial_nominees_with_aclu_dna_video.php.
341 WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 89 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
342 Id. at 527.
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within the core-identity DNA metaphor.343 They bring deeper
meaning to society’s understanding of behavior and identity. More
to the point here, the richness of the features captured by the DNA
metaphor tells us more about what society thinks about DNA.
That DNA is about core identity for those who use DNA
metaphors to explain behavior and identity reinforces the sense
that society views DNA as involving core identity. The use of DNA
metaphors by writers, reviewers, journalists, and senators to help
their audiences understand behavior and identity presumes that
the core-identity DNA metaphor is a familiar one shared by their
audiences.
It also suggests that society’s sense of the role of DNA in
defining part of one’s identity is much more profound than its
sense of the role of fingerprints. An examination of the use of a
fingerprint as a metaphor in USA Today and the New York Times
reinforces this distinction. Over approximately six-months, 86.4%
of the uses of the word “fingerprint” in USA Today were scientific
or forensic and 13.6% were metaphorical. In the New York Times,
79.6% were scientific or forensic and 20.4% were metaphorical.344
As with DNA metaphors, the fingerprint metaphors were
always metaphors about identity. Whatever the metaphor was
lending more meaning or grounding to, it did so by capturing an
aspect of identity represented by a fingerprint. For example:
The neighborhood itself is a spur to creativity, she
said.
“The really amazing thing about that area is one
building will be a stage, but if you look into the next
little warehouse, somebody’s packing tomatoes, and if
you look into the one beyond, somebody’s making
glass,” Ms. Dokoza said. “It’s a very unusual
neighborhood, with the Polish bakeries—like a
fingerprint of yesteryear.”345

343
344
345

LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 303, at 140.
There were 98 uses in the New York Times and 59 uses in USA Today.
Alison Gregor, Lights, Camera, Pierogi: Movies in Greenpoint, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010,
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The aspect of identity captured by the fingerprint metaphors
differed from that captured by the DNA metaphor. The DNA
metaphor
captured
core-identity
aspects:
permanence,
immutability, fatalism, etc. The fingerprint metaphor captured
only more superficial aspects of identity—trace, brand,
identification tag, and signature. For example:
Some of the answers will become clearer with
further analysis of the radiation in the water, Sich
said, noting that the presence of certain isotopes could
help determine whether the contamination came from
the reactor core or a spent fuel pool.
“We need to see the chemical analysis of the water,”
he said. “That’s the fingerprint.”346
The contrast between the metaphorical uses of DNA and
fingerprints in the public discourse mirrors the distinctions drawn
between the two in the discussion above about genetic privacy.347
DNA contains a multi-dimensional kaleidoscope of identity, and a
fingerprint operates as a one-dimensional trace of physical
presence. The manifestations of societal attitudes revealed in the
uses of such metaphors confirm the relative weightiness and
richness of attitudes towards DNA.
These attitudes do not directly address the critical Katz
inquiry—whether society is willing to recognize an expectation of
privacy in DNA as reasonable. However, if society’s attitudes
concerning DNA reflect a sense that it is about core-identity, it
strongly suggests that society would accept as reasonable that one
expects privacy in that identity.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/realestate/commercial/21greenpoint.html?scp=100&sq=fin
gerprint&st=nyt.
346 Radiation Spreading to Seawater, Soil in Japan, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 28, 2011,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-03-27-japan-nuclear_N.htm.
347 See supra Part V.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Unregulated surreptitious DNA harvesting is at the
intersection of modern technology and the Fourth Amendment. It
is a creative crime-solving tool that capitalizes on advances in
modern genetic research and forensic science. It follows on the
heels of more frequent applications of forensic DNA technology
that use suspect samples obtained via search warrants and genetic
databases. It is at the forefront of genetic investigation creativity
with familial searching and the indictment of genetic profiles in
the absence of a known suspect.
The early courts that evaluated the constitutionality of DNA
harvesting have not been as creative. Using a Fourth Amendment
analytical model focused narrowly on property-oriented privacy,
those courts have mishandled the analysis. They have relied on a
superficial abandonment approach that not only allows the police
to engage in the practice without any prior justification but also
effectively allows the police to use the harvested DNA for any
purpose at any time.
A rigorous application of the traditional Katz test for Fourth
Amendment searches produces a different focus. Such an analysis
asks whether an individual has abandoned the expectation of
privacy in the DNA within the nucleus of a cell that is found on an
abandoned item, not whether one has abandoned the DNA.
The result of that analysis is quite different from that of the
early DNA harvesting courts. The physical, informational, and
dignitary dimensions of genetic privacy produce an expectation of
privacy in the kaleidoscope of identity that is DNA. And that
expectation of privacy is one that society more than likely is
willing to recognize as reasonable. Popular culture uses DNA
metaphors as a reference point to explain a number of features of
core identity—permanence, immutability, inevitability, and
intimacy. Popular culture’s frequent uses of DNA as a reference
point for core-identity reverberate in a way that suggests that
society does recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy in
DNA.

526

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:445

If so, then the police conduct a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes when they enter a cell, its nucleus, and the DNA therein
to get identity information. They do not need a search warrant or
probable cause to seize the abandoned item in or on which the cells
and DNA exist. But they do need a search warrant supported by
probable cause to enter the cell to harvest and sample the DNA.348
This rule is consistent with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
It acknowledges the changes in expectation of privacy of
identifying information that has come with the rapid advances in
genetic research and technology. It places an appropriate and
well-measured hurdle between the police and the individual.

348 This requirement, as yet unsupported by case law, is partially supported by the
Standard 16-2.2(b) of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for DNA Evidence:
(b) Except in exigent circumstances, a judicial order for collecting a DNA
sample from the body of a person should be issued only upon notice and
after an opportunity for a hearing at which the person has a right to
counsel, including the right to appointed counsel if the person is indigent.
(i) If the person from whom the sample is to be collected is suspected of
committing a crime, an order should issue only upon an application
demonstrating:
(A)
probable cause that a serious crime has been committed, and
(B)
if the sample is to be collected from a person is:
(1) a sample collected by a physically noninvasive means,
reasonable suspicion that the person committed the crime
charged.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DNA EVIDENCE § 16-2.2(b) (2006).

